EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 13.12.2021
SWD(2021) 381 final
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
Accompanying the document
REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION
on the ex post evaluation
of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF)
2014-2020
{COM(2021) 788 final}
Table of contents
1.Introduction
Purpose and scope
2.Background to the intervention
a.
Description of the intervention
b.
EGF objectives
c.
Key specifics of the EGF intervention
d.
Baseline and points of comparison
3.Implementation / state of play
4.Method
a.
Short description of methodology
b.
Limitations
5.Analysis and answers to the evaluation questions
5.1.EFFECTIVENESS
a.
Re-integration rates and other effects of the EGF support
b.
Availability of support for all eligible beneficiaries
c.
Use of the EGF by Member States and by beneficiaries
d.
Monitoring and reporting
e.
Factors contributing to or hindering the achievement of objectives
f.
Involvement of companies and social partners
g.
Information and communication activities
h.
Overall impact of the EGF
5.2.EFFICIENCY
a.
Efficiency at case level
b.
Efficiency at instrument level
5.3.COHERENCE
a.
Complementarity with other EU policies and initiatives
b.
Complementarity with national measures and instruments
5.4.RELEVANCE
a.
Relevance of the scope of the EGF
b.
Relevance of the intervention criteria of the EGF
c.
Relevance of the NEETs clause
5.5.EU ADDED VALUE
6.Conclusions and lessons-learned
Conclusions
Lessons-learned
Annex 1: Procedural information
Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation
Annex 3: Methods and analytical models
Annex 4: Case profile data by Member State and by sector
Annex 5: EGF intervention logic 2014-2020
Annex 6: The evolution of the rules of the EGF between 2007 and 2020
List of figures
Figure 1 The timeline of an EGF case from start to finish
Figure 2. Large-scale restructuring events in EU-27, 2007–2020
Figure 3. Monthly unemployment rates (% of active population), EU-27, 2007–2020
Figure 4 Number of applications received 2007–2020 (without withdrawn and rejected applications) (based on EGF Database)
Figure 5. Case applications per cause (left) and intervention criterion (right)
Figure 6. Workers and NEETs targeted (left); men and women targeted (right)
Figure 7. Beneficiaries assisted (left); workers and NEETs assisted vs targeted (right)
Figure 8. Beneficiaries (workers + NEETs) targeted and assisted per Member State
Figure 9. Change in re-integration rates per case (short term vs long term)
Figure 10. Average absorption rate per Member State
Figure 11. Relationship between total EGF amounts spent and number of beneficiaries helped, per Member State
Figure 12. Breakdown of the 39 responses received by Member State
Figure 13. NEETs targeted compared to NEETs reached
Figure 14. Number of EGF cases per sector (NACE Rev. 2) for all 54 cases in 2014-2020
List of tables
Table 1 Number of applications received 2007–2020
Table 2. EGF applications received and amount requested by Member State, 2007–2020
Table 3. Stakeholder consultation strategy: overview
Table 4. Evaluation questions and sub-questions
Table 5. General overview of the 54 applications received between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2020
Table 6. EGF applications sorted by Member States
Table 7. EGF applications sorted by sector
Table 8. EGF applications, including the breakdown by gender and age of targeted workers and helped workers
Glossary
Term or acronym
|
Meaning or definition
|
Beneficiary
|
A person benefiting directly from an EGF measure
|
BRG
|
Better Regulation Guidelines
|
DG EMPL
|
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
|
EGF
|
European Globalisation Adjustment Fund
|
ERM
|
European Restructuring Monitor (Eurofound)
|
ESF
|
European Social Fund
|
ESF+
|
European Social Fund Plus
|
ESIFs
|
European Structural and Investment Funds
|
EU
|
European Union
|
FAQs
|
Frequently asked questions
|
GDPR
|
General Data Protection Regulation
|
ISSG
|
Interservice Steering Group
|
MFF
|
Multiannual financial framework
|
NEET
|
Person not in employment, education or training
|
PC
|
Public consultation
|
PES
|
Public employment services
|
QFR
|
EU Quality Framework for anticipation of change and restructuring
|
SFC
|
System for Fund Management in the European Union
|
SMEs
|
Small and medium-sized enterprises
|
SWD
|
Staff working document
|
YEI
|
Youth Employment Initiative
|
1.Introduction
This staff working document (SWD) presents the results of the ex post evaluation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) for 2014–2020. This evaluation was carried out in compliance with Article 20(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013, to assess whether the EGF reached its objectives during the period 2014–2020.
Purpose and scope
The findings of this ex post evaluation can provide lessons for the future implementation and design of the Fund. The evaluation assesses the EGF’s effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and the EU added value. It also examines the extent to which the EGF interventions complement and are coherent with other programmes such as the European Social Fund (ESF), the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) and national measures. The evaluation covers all EGF cases (i.e. approved applications) whose applications were received between 2014 and 31 December 2020. Applications received in 2020 are included but without analysis as the results will only be available in 2023.
More information can be found in the evaluation’s roadmap.
This SWD mainly builds on the results of the supporting study provided by external experts (hereinafter ‘Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020)’). The study includes extensive stakeholder consultations (see Annex 2). It also includes, where appropriate, additional further evidence from previous reports, evaluations and general experience in the management of the EGF, including the Commission internal EGF Database with all the EGF cases from 2007 to 2020. The fieldwork for the supporting study had just started when the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. More information about the limitations caused by the pandemic are presented in Chapter 4 below.
The results of this evaluation will be sent to the European Parliament, the Council, the Court of Auditors, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and to the social partners.
2.Background to the intervention
a.Description of the intervention
The EGF is a European Union (EU) instrument, which aims to tackle the employment and social dimensions of structural change. The EGF was initially established in 2006, with the aim of showing the EU’s solidarity with workers made redundant as a result of major structural changes in world trade patterns due to globalisation.
In response to the global economic and financial crisis, some clauses of the EGF Regulation were amended in 2009. For the 2014–2020 programming period, the EGF covered redundancies caused not only by globalisation and the continuation of the global financial and economic crisis, but also by any new global financial and economic crisis. Due to the high youth unemployment rates in many parts of the EU, Member States were allowed to include, under certain circumstances, the same number of young people ‘not in education, employment, or training’ (NEETs) as workers made redundant in EGF applications.
The EGF assistance takes the form of a coordinated package of personalised services. The EGF co-finances active labour market policy measures implemented by Member States with the aim of helping the largest possible number of beneficiaries find sustainable new jobs as soon as possible within 6 months after the end of EGF assistance. The Fund supplements national labour market measures when sudden collective redundancy processes put the public employment services under extraordinary pressure. It can also provide a more personalised approach to the most vulnerable redundant workers, such as disadvantaged beneficiaries, including young and older unemployed people and those at risk of poverty, enabling them to update their knowledge and skills, or benefit from other suitable measures (e.g. mobility allowances).
Member States’ applications must comply with one of the intervention criteria (i.e. conditions for EGF support) set out in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013:
· at least 500 redundancies over a period of 4 months in an enterprise in a Member State, including workers made redundant in its suppliers or downstream producers;
· at least 500 redundancies over a period of 9 months, particularly in small or medium-sized enterprises, operating in the same economic sector and located in one region or two contiguous regions;
· in small labour markets or in exceptional circumstances, when duly substantiated by the Member State concerned, an application for a contribution from the EGF may be considered admissible even if the intervention criteria in points (a) or (b) are not entirely met, when redundancies have a serious impact on employment and the local economy. This clause was amended in 2018, adding the possibility to cover collective applications involving SMEs located in one region and operating in different economic sectors, where the applicant Member State demonstrates that SMEs are the main or the only type of business in that region.
The possibility for Member States to include, under certain circumstances, NEETs in EGF applications, was introduced in 2014, and extended until 31 December 2020, under different rules.
The EGF is an emergency relief instrument, outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF). The EU has provided the EGF with a maximum annual ceiling of up to EUR 150 million (2011 prices). The co-financing of each case must be approved by the European Parliament and the Council. In practice, the annual amount used is dependent on the number and the requested amounts of the applications received. The maximum amount ever used in a given year was EUR 132.1 million (in 2010).
On 27 May 2020, in its communication The EU budget powering the recovery plan for Europe, the European Commission declared that the COVID-19 pandemic had resulted in an economic crisis, and set out a recovery plan for the economy. This included the EGF as an emergency tool to assist people who lost their jobs due to a global financial and economic crisis.
b.EGF objectives
The overall aim of the EGF was defined in line with Europe 2020 strategy, to contribute to smart, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and to promote sustainable employment in the EU. The EGF aims to express solidarity with and provide support to workers made redundant and self-employed persons whose activity ceased due to globalisation or a global financial and economic crisis.
In November 2017, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission jointly proclaimed the European Pillar of Social Rights. Among the pillar’s 20 principles and rights is a principle on how to help people to find and change their employment. The EGF puts this principle into practice in the case of major restructuring events.
The EGF’s objective of improving participants’ education/training and labour market situation has two dimensions: solidarity and emergency relief.
Solidarity relates to supporting the re-integration of redundant workers into the labour market, with a particular focus on the most vulnerable groups of dismissed workers.
The emergency dimension refers to EU’s intention of providing reactive support in cases of unexpected mass redundancies when national administrations would find it extremely difficult to cope with the situation by themselves.
Main objectives of the EGF:
·demonstrate solidarity towards workers made redundant and self-employed persons whose activity has ceased
·offer assistance to workers made redundant so that they can re-integrate into the job market, finding high quality employment as soon as possible within 6 months after the end of EGF assistance.
Functioning
EGF assistance is provided mainly through active labour market measures, ranging from personalised guidance and training courses to assistance in setting up a business. These measures help beneficiaries return to employment as quickly as possible by enabling them to update their knowledge and skills or benefit from other suitable support. In many cases, the new skills respond to the needs of emerging economic sectors, so that they can help the region to maintain and develop its economic activities.
The EGF can be mobilised following a request (‘EGF application’) made by an EU Member State in need of assistance further to an unexpected major restructuring event. Applications are submitted by national EGF authorities to the European Commission. Under Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013, it is up to the Member State to decide on the working arrangements for the implementation of each case.
The Member State must include in its application to the Commission information such as:
-a detailed explanation of the causal link between the redundancies and globalisation or the global economic and financial crisis (the Member State is expected to provide a reasoned analysis supported by relevant data at the most appropriate geographical and sectoral levels);
-a description of the enterprise or enterprises affected;
-a detailed categorisation of the targeted redundant workers into several groups by gender and age group);
-a description of the redundancies’ expected impact on the local, regional or national economy and employment, including statistical and qualitative information; and
-a description of the package of personalised services to be financed, together with its planned budget.
The applications are then assessed by the Commission. For those it accepts, it proposes to the budgetary authority (the European Parliament and the Council) that the EGF be mobilised. Once the budgetary authority has adopted the decision to mobilise the Fund, the Commission pays the contribution to the applicant Member State.
In principle, cases may be implemented for a maximum period of 24 months from the date the application is submitted. However, Member States can start providing eligible services to the workers before this happens.
Once implementation is completed, the Member State must submit, within 6 months, a final report on the execution of the financial contribution, together with a statement justifying the expenditure. The final report must also include extensive qualitative information on the type of measures, main outcomes and lessons learned, as well as the characteristics of targeted beneficiaries and their employment status. A long-term report on the employment status of the beneficiaries is also submitted 18 months after the end of the implementation (see Figure 1 below).
Information about all EGF applications can be found on the EGF website.
Figure 1 The timeline of an EGF case from start to finish
Source: European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL).
The overall intervention logic of the EGF is summarised in Annex 5.
c.Key specifics of the EGF intervention
Since January 2007, when the first EGF Regulation entered into force, the rules of the Fund have been adapted several times in order to respond to the economic situation in the EU. Initially, in the 2007–2013 programming period, the EGF was operating under an annual maximum ceiling of EUR 500 million, and was targeting large-scale events in which a minimum of 1 000 workers were made redundant. Case implementation took place over a 12-month timeframe. The EGF was co-financing measures at a rate of 50%.
Based on the experience of the 2007–2013 period, several changes were introduced in 2014–2020 to improve the EGF’s effectiveness and efficiency and to adapt it to the economic situation within the EU. The changes included:
·the new criterion of any new global financial and economic crisis, besides the trade-related globalisation or the global economic and financial crisis;
·new categories of workers supported i.e. not only those with indefinite employment contracts, but also workers with fixed-term contracts, temporary agency workers, owner-managers of micro enterprises and self-employed workers;
·support to NEETs under certain conditions;
·a lowered threshold of 500 redundancies. An even lower threshold was also acceptable under certain conditions for small labour markets or in exceptional circumstances;
·a longer implementation period from 12 to 24 months;
·shortened procedures to mobilise funding;
·co-financing rate raised to 60% (from 50%).
The budget of an EGF application can also include, besides the co-financing of the coordinated package of personalised measures, the costs of the preparatory, management, information and publicity, control and reporting activities .
The EGF does not cover passive social protection measures such as pensions. Nor does it cover passive allowances, i.e. allowances that are not conditional on the targeted beneficiaries’ active participation in job-search or training activities. The co-financing cannot replace actions that are the responsibility of enterprises by virtue of national law or collective agreements (e.g. redundancy pay, legal requirements to draw up a social plan – depending on the national law of the Member State concerned).
To provide proportional assistance, and in line with the findings of an audit of the 2007–2013 EGF, the co-financing of allowances was capped at 35% of the total package of personalised measures. Such allowances can only be co-financed if they are directly connected to participation in EGF measures.
Member States can choose when to start implementing EGF measures: either before submitting the application to the Commission, as early as when the dismissals occurred, or from the date the application is submitted. They can even postpone the start of the implementation by 3 months. This flexibility enables Member States to start helping beneficiaries right after the redundancies occur; these measures are also eligible for EGF co-financing. However, until the decision to mobilise the EGF is approved, Member States implement at their own risk. Member States can also end implementation before the 24 months have elapsed.
The 2021–2027 EGF Regulation introduced significant changes, such as:
·extended scope of eligibility (i.e. in what situations the EGF can provide support) to include any unexpected major restructuring;
·decreased threshold of dismissals from 500 to 200;
·aligned co-financing rate with European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) (while keeping the current 60% as a minimum);
·increase of the maximum annual ceiling up to EUR 186 million (2018 prices);
·common indicators and stricter requirements for reporting;
·NEETs no longer supported by the EGF.
The evolution of the main rules of the EGF between 2007 and 2020 is presented in Annex 6.
d.Baseline and points of comparison
Context
The core drivers of globalisation used to be trade in goods and capital flows. Today, stimulated by rapid technological change, globalisation is increasingly knowledge-driven. Nowadays, most products are no longer made in one single country and global cooperation is increasingly essential.
Global trade openness has boosted EU economic growth and competitiveness, and has created job opportunities, but it can also result in significant job losses through business restructuring, offshoring and company closures. Globalisation and rapid technological advance have increased demand for skilled labour but reduced the number of jobs for low-skilled workers, particularly in the manufacturing industries, the most exposed to offshoring. Workers made redundant within these industries – especially low-skilled and vulnerable workers – have been hit particularly hard and struggle to acquire the necessary (new or more) skills to re-join the labour market.
Eurofound’s European Restructuring Monitor (ERM) is the most comprehensive source of data that records all announcements of redundancies in a certain year. According to the ERM database, on average about 670 restructuring events (of any size) occurred within the EU-27 on a yearly basis between 2007 and 2020, increasing from 435 in 2019 to 770 in 2020 (+77%). The latter is the highest total number since 2012 and can largely be attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic. Large-scale restructuring events (involving 500 or more job losses) have increased since 2018, reaching 172 in 2020 (+68% compared to 2019) (see Figure 2 below).
Figure 2. Large-scale restructuring events in EU-27, 2007–2020
Source: Eurofound, European Restructuring Monitor Database
Over 2014–2020, manufacturing accounted for the largest share of restructuring events, even though its share fluctuated over the years. Manufacturing is the sector most affected by offshoring, accounting for about 83% of all offshoring cases in the EU-27 in the ERM dataset. During 2014–2020, there were seven EGF cases targeting redundancies in the manufacturing sectors (see details in Table 5).
In recent years, the vast majority of larger restructuring cases are no longer triggered by trade-related globalisation, but by technological advances, especially automation, which is continuously increasing both in scope and in rate. Technological advances such as digitisation or automation are a significant source of growth, but can also lead to adverse short-term effects on the labour market. Thus, investment in digital skills will be extremely important for industrial competitiveness.
According to the OECD, recent data show that about 14% of jobs are at high risk of automation. By sector, the risk of automation is higher for manufacturing and agriculture, although jobs in a number of service sectors such as postal and courier services, land transport and food services also face a high risk. Going forward, the risk of automation is increasingly falling on low-educated workers. The COVID-19 crisis is likely to accelerate automation as companies reduce reliance on human labour and contact between workers, or re-shore some production.
During the last decade, the general trend in employment rates has been positive. In 2019, 73.9% of the EU population aged 20 to 64 were employed, up from 69.2% in 2014. This was the highest rate since 2002. However, large differences in employment rate remained between Member States and between gender and age groups.
Since March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to lockdowns around Europe, which brought a wave of job losses. Poverty and inequality have risen, and the low-skilled and vulnerable people are the most affected. It also led to four EGF applications based on the COVID crisis being submitted at the end of 2020.
In the first half of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic caused the deepest recession in EU history. Annual GDP fell by 6.4% in the EU in 2020 compared to 2019. Monthly unemployment rates steadily increased starting from March 2020, from an average of 6.6% in March 2020, to 7.3% in December 2020, as shown in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3. Monthly unemployment rates (% of active population), EU-27, 2007–2020
Source: Eurostat, [ei_lmhr_m]
On youth unemployment, the overall trend has been comparable, i.e. a steady decrease since 2014 and a recent surge (since March 2020) linked to the COVID-19 crisis. However, even before the COVID crisis, the youth unemployment rate was above 20% in some regions across 10 Member States.
Baseline
Employment policies are a shared competence between the EU and the Member States. The EU aims to contribute to a high level of employment by supporting and, if necessary, complementing Member State action.
In line with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, funding from the EU is granted when objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States alone, and where the EU intervention can bring added value. The EU’s main solidarity response consists of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIFs) and the EGF. The Cohesion Fund aims to support economic and social cohesion within the EU, while the European Social Fund (ESF) is the main instrument in the area of employment. The latter has a long-term anticipative multiannual strategic approach. This is not adapted to react rapidly in case of sudden major redundancies.
The EGF was set up to enable the EU to react to such unforeseen large-scale restructuring events. The restructuring challenges presented above are the responsibility of the national public employment services (PES). However, when unexpected large-scale restructuring events occur, with a significant impact on the regional labour market, the PES might have difficulties offering targeted measures with clear exit strategies to a large number of redundancies only through national programmes.
At the request of a Member State, the EGF can co-finance active labour market measures aimed at bringing the dismissed workers back into stable employment. The EGF intervention supplements national labour market measures for redundant workers. It also creates European added value by increasing the number, variety and intensity of services offered to redundant workers, and for a longer time than would be possible without EGF funding
.
Under the first EGF Regulation (2007–2013), a total of 128 applications were received, out of which 15 were withdrawn and one was rejected by the Commission. The successful applications were submitted by 20 Member States and concerned 39 sectors. Assistance worth EUR 478 million was requested to help more than 105 000 workers.
The second EGF Regulation, covering 2014–2020, entered into effect on 1 January 2014. Applications submitted under the first Regulation continued to be implemented and were wound up under the rules of the first Regulation. Those cases are not covered by this evaluation.
From 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2020, 59 applications were submitted by Member States. Of these, 54 applications were approved, 4 were later withdrawn and 1 was rejected by the Council. These 54 approved applications requested EUR 173.4 million to support a total of 58 267 targeted people, of which 4 099 were NEETs. See Annex 4 for the overview of all 2014–2020 EGF applications received (without withdrawn and rejected applications).
In a 2019 report by the Directorate-General Joint Research Centre, the RHOMOLO-IO modelling framework was applied to the EGF in order to illustrate how the application of a standard input-output model can generate a variety of results of interest for both researchers and policy makers. The key idea behind this model lies in the representation of sectoral interdependence. The RHOMOLO-IO simulations were performed on 23 EGF cases from 2014–2015. The results suggest that besides the direct effect of re-employment, EGF impacts have positive indirect effects, as each additional job created influences other sectors positively.
Trends can be observed from looking at the number of applications received from 2007 and 2020 (Figure 4 and Table 1 below). The crisis criterion was on a downward trend after 2014, when the EU was on a path of economic growth and decreasing unemployment. This lasted until 2020 when the COVID-19 crisis started, resulting in many jobs lost and a new wave of EGF applications under the crisis criterion. The trade-related globalisation criterion went through a similar trend, although it was used to a larger extent as the effects of globalisation are continuously affecting the labour force.
Figure 4 Number of applications received 2007–2020 (without withdrawn and rejected applications) (based on EGF Database)
Table 1 Number of applications received 2007–2020 (without withdrawn and rejected applications)
Source: EGF Database
Table 2. EGF applications received and amount requested by Member State, 2007–2020 (without withdrawn and rejected applications)
Member States which have applied for EGF funding
|
Number of applications
|
EGF contribution (EUR)
|
Number of targeted beneficiaries
|
Average amount requested per beneficiary (EUR)
|
Belgium
|
14
|
42 940 897
|
18 615
|
2 307
|
Czechia
|
1
|
323 820
|
460
|
704
|
Denmark
|
10
|
63 680 782
|
6 234
|
10 215
|
Germany
|
11
|
56 134 386
|
15 639
|
3 589
|
Estonia
|
2
|
5 605 838
|
5 860
|
957
|
Ireland
|
10
|
67 720 204
|
11 209
|
6 042
|
Greece
|
9
|
43 267 750
|
8 074
|
5 359
|
Spain
|
24
|
51 556 535
|
15 735
|
3 277
|
France
|
9
|
99 655 342
|
19 444
|
5 125
|
Italy
|
14
|
63 885 181
|
14 396
|
4 438
|
Lithuania
|
5
|
2 861 619
|
3 013
|
950
|
Malta
|
1
|
681 207
|
675
|
1 009
|
Netherlands
|
19
|
35 186 039
|
10 359
|
3 397
|
Austria
|
6
|
27 998 090
|
1 952
|
14 343
|
Poland
|
5
|
2 575 712
|
1 806
|
1 426
|
Portugal
|
6
|
13 287 994
|
5 827
|
2 280
|
Romania
|
2
|
6 513 830
|
2 416
|
2 696
|
Slovenia
|
1
|
2 247 940
|
2 554
|
880
|
Finland
|
11
|
38 377 138
|
13 161
|
2 916
|
Sweden
|
6
|
27 502 116
|
5 868
|
4 687
|
Total
|
166
|
652 002 420
|
163 297
|
3 993
|
Source: EGF Database
3.Implementation / state of play
Description of the current situation
This section provides an overview of EGF implementation. It includes figures on EGF applications and covers the Fund’s performance by country and by economic sector defined at NACE Revision 2 division level. The profile of people targeted by the EGF (by sex, age and status of dismissed worker or NEET) is also reported.
Since the EGF became operational in 2007, the number of applications has been highly cyclical, responding with a delay to economic developments.
The supporting study covered all EGF applications submitted between January 2014 and May 2020, of which one was rejected by the Council (still during the timeframe observed). There were also four withdrawn applications (of which one was later re-submitted), not included in the total mentioned above. The background of three of the withdrawn applications had been analysed and the findings have been included in the supporting study’s results. The reasons for the withdrawal of the three cases were: (i) the need to gather more statistical data and references and re-submit the application; and (ii) the fact that a direct link between the redundancies and the global financial and economic crisis could not be demonstrated. The fourth withdrawn application is not covered as it was withdrawn in 2021.
The cases for which applications were submitted in 2014 had already been evaluated during the mid-term evaluation of the 2014–2020 EGF. The supporting study for the ex post evaluation also took into consideration the findings from these cases.
In what follows, only the 49 approved applications (i.e. EGF cases) are considered, because the withdrawn and rejected applications did not receive any EGF funding. At the end of 2020, six EGF applications were received, of which one was later withdrawn. The five approved applications are partially covered in the overview of 2014–2020 EGF applications (Annex 4), as they had been approved by the budgetary authority when this staff working document was drafted.
Breakdown of EGF cases by event type and intervention criterion
In the majority of the 49 EGF cases (61%), redundancies were caused by major changes in world trade patterns due to globalisation, while the effects of economic or financial crises were the cause in 39% of cases. Most of the cases concerned redundancies in a single company (and its downstream suppliers) (criterion a), followed by ‘sectoral’ cases involving several companies operating in the same sector (criterion b). Exceptional circumstances or small labour markets (criterion c) constituted the smallest share of EGF cases (see Figure 5 below).
Figure 5. Case applications per cause (left) and intervention criterion (right)
Source: Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 11
Breakdown of EGF cases per Member State
In terms of geographical reach, these 49 EGF cases covered 12 Member States: Belgium (6), Estonia (1), Finland (7), France (5), Germany (3), Greece (8), Ireland (3), Italy (3), the Netherlands (3), Portugal (1), Spain (6) and Sweden (3). These Member States had benefited from the EGF during the 2007–2013 programming period as well, except for Estonia, which applied for the first time during 2014–2020.
The total number of people targeted was highest in Belgium (9 925), followed by France (9 620) and Greece (7 432). Only 12 EGF cases (from five Member States – Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal) used the possibility to support NEETs through the EGF, targeting 4 099 NEETs in total.
Breakdown of people targeted through EGF cases
Across all 49 cases, 49 562 people (workers and NEETs) were targeted via EGF measures. Of the 45 463 targeted workers, 70% were men and 30% women. The numbers differ significantly across cases, with a high number of female beneficiaries in cases assisting workers dismissed in traditionally ‘female-dominated’ sectors such as retail trade and the wearing apparel sector, and men beneficiaries in traditionally ‘male-dominated’ sectors such as transport and manufacturing (see Figure 6 below).
Figure 6. Workers and NEETs targeted (left); men and women targeted (right)
Source: Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 12
As for age groups, the 45 463 workers targeted belonged to the following age groups: 15–24 (2.6%), 25–54 (72%), 55–64 (24%), and above 64 years old (1.4%).
Breakdown of cases per sector
The most common sectors were retail trade (6 cases) and automotive (5 cases). Computer programming and the manufacture of computers, electronic and optical products were each the subject of three EGF cases. The cases in the automotive sector targeted the largest number of beneficiaries, 10 299 people in total. The smallest number of people targeted in a single case was 276 persons in the jewellery sector.
Completed EGF cases
Of the 49 EGF cases outlined above, 48 had ended by December 2020 and 46 had submitted their final report before the supporting study was sent to the Commission. The analysis of the results will only be based on these 46 final reports. Across these 46 cases, 39 596 people were assisted in total – 37 072 workers and 2 524 NEETs. This means that 82% of targeted workers and 62% of targeted NEETs were helped by the EGF (see Figure 7 below).
Figure 7. Beneficiaries assisted (left); workers and NEETs assisted vs targeted (right)
Source: Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 46
As for the distribution across Member States, the largest numbers of beneficiaries assisted were in France, Belgium and Finland, while the smallest numbers were in Estonia and Sweden. The rates of beneficiaries helped ranged from 33% (Sweden) to 101% (Finland), as presented in Figure 8 below.
Figure 8. Beneficiaries (workers + NEETs) targeted and assisted per Member State
Source: Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p. 16
Across the 46 cases, about EUR 89 million in EGF funds were spent in total, compared to about EUR 151 million allocated. This gave an overall absorption rate of 59%. The average absorption rates for individual Member States ranged from 29% (Estonia) to 90% (Finland).
In 2020, 7 applications were submitted by 6 Member States (2 by Spain, and 1 each by Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands). Apart from one application from Spain submitted in May 2020, the remaining 6 applications were not covered by the supporting study because they were submitted in November and December 2020. Six applications have been approved and one was withdrawn. Of the approved applications, 2 were submitted under the trade-related globalisation criterion and 4 under the new economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
The total EGF contribution requested for the 6 applications received in 2020 (without the withdrawn one) was almost EUR 18.1 million, targeting 9 205 workers.
An overview of all EGF applications submitted between 2014–2020, together with case profile data by Member State and by sector, can be found in Annex 4.
During the 2014–2020 period, to promote exchanges of best practice and provide information about the latest EGF developments, the Commission organised twice-yearly EGF contact persons’ meetings and networking seminars (aimed at EGF implementers). Until end-2019, the meetings took place in Member States implementing EGF cases. As of March 2020, meetings took place online because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The EGF meetings and seminars received positive feedback from stakeholders (about 60 participants on average).
4.Method
a.Short description of methodology
One supporting study was contracted out. The evaluation questions derived from the Better Regulation evaluation criteria were broken down into a number of sub-questions and agreed with the Interservice Steering Group. An appropriate mix of evaluation methods was applied, including different kinds of stakeholder consultations according to a predefined stakeholder consultation strategy. The research methods included:
-Desk research:
oAnalysis for each EGF case of all the data available in the SFC2014 (System for Fund Management in the European Union) database;
oIn-depth analysis of the biennial report, the frequently asked questions, reports from the EGF contact persons meetings and networking seminars, EGF press releases, etc.;
oThe Commission internal EGF Database;
oData and literature review of existing data and literature was carried out at two levels: EU level and case level. The EU-level review covered legislative documents, previous evaluations of the EGF, studies and the proposal for the EGF 2021–2027. The case-level review was carried out by national experts in the 12 Member States that received EGF co-financing during the 2014–2020 period, and covered all relevant case information
;
oThe Commission’s additional desk research.
-Consultation activities:
oOnline EGF networking seminar was organised by the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion in March 2020, as a first consultation activity. Relevant stakeholders were invited and the planned stakeholder consultations were discussed.
oTargeted online surveys:
§The 16 Member States
that did not apply for EGF co-financing during the 2014–2020 period were interviewed to uncover the reasons why they did not apply and to gather their views on the appropriateness of the application process and the Fund’s overall relevance.
§EGF beneficiaries were interviewed to gain a perspective on the experience and impact of the EGF support, and to gather views on how the EGF compares to other forms of support for redundant workers (and NEETs).
oPublic consultation: assisting the Commission in developing the questionnaire, and analysing the results of the public consultation. The results of the 12-week public consultation can be found in Annex 2.
oIn-depth interviews conducted at EU level and at case level with desk officers, managing authorities and other stakeholders, in particular for the case studies
.
oOnline focus groups / (group) interviews with EGF beneficiaries to uncover whether and to what extent the EGF has had a (lasting) impact on individual beneficiaries, from the perspective of those who actually received the support.
-Case studies: addressing the research questions, based on desk research, interviews, targeted survey and focus groups. The case studies reports were not published.
-Counterfactual impact evaluation (CIE) to analyse how fast a person who receives EGF-funded support finds a new job compared to a person who did not receive EGF support.
The Commission based this evaluation mainly on the results of the supporting study, complementing it where appropriate with additional evidence from previous reports, evaluations, general experience in the management of the EGF and other sources such as the Commission’s internal EGF Database.
Further details on the methodology are explained in Annex 3.
b.Limitations
The findings and conclusions are reasonably robust, as they are based on sufficient combination (‘triangulation’) of sources and tools, such as the data reported by the monitoring systems, the stakeholder consultation and case studies. However, the evaluation also faced several limitations. Firstly, the timing of the EGF ex post evaluation did not allow for analysis of EGF cases from 2020. Secondly, there were limited comparators with the 2007–2013 programming period, and sectoral analysis was not possible because of the overall small number of EGF applications. There were also difficulties in reaching EGF beneficiaries and identifying whether survey respondents actually benefited from EGF measures. On top of that, there were limited replies to the public consultation, inconclusive results from the counterfactual impact evaluation, and delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
These limitations were overcome during the study by collecting data from different sources such as surveys, in-depth interviews and a public consultation. These data sources provided opinions and perceptions of various stakeholders, which in some instances may be the only available source of evidence.
More details about the limitations are explained in Annex 3.
5.Analysis and answers to the evaluation questions
The evaluation questions that guided the evaluation process were set out in the terms of reference for the supporting study (see in Annex 3).
5.1.EFFECTIVENESS
The effectiveness criterion assesses the extent to which the EGF objectives have been met at both instrument and case level. It also analyses the impact of the Fund as a whole. This was done in particular by analysing: (a) the extent to which the EGF manages to ensure sustainable re-integration of redundant workers; (b) the availability of support for all eligible beneficiaries; (c) the use of the EGF; (d) monitoring and reporting; (e) factors helping or hindering the achievement of objectives; (f) involvement of companies and social partners; and (g) information and communication activities. It also includes lessons learned from the EGF implementation and the Fund’s overall impact.
a.Re-integration rates and other effects of the EGF support
Re-integration rates
In all EGF cases, the main aim was to bring workers made redundant back into work as quickly as possible. Based on the available case data received by the Commission for 46 final reports (out of 49 cases), the EGF has generally been effective in terms of the re-integration rates achieved, with an average re-integration rate of around 60%. The re-integration rate for worker beneficiaries varied between 33% and 88%. This is higher than in the 2007–2013 programming period, and higher than the target of 50% set in the impact assessment for the 2014–2020 EGF. However, this apparent improvement needs to be viewed with caution as the implementation period for cases was much longer during 2014–2020 (24 months or longer if the implementation started early) than in the previous programming period (12 months).
For NEETs beneficiaries, in total 19% of those helped by the EGF were employed, self-employed or returned to education by the time of submission of the final reports. One of the reasons for this result was given by some Member States, which underlined that NEETs were more difficult to engage and activate than dismissed workers.
Overall, in the longer term (i.e. 18 months after the end of the implementation period), the total rate of re-integration across all cases was 60%, practically the same as for the short-term results (6 months after the end of the implementation period). However, results improved in most Member States in the long term, with only three countries experiencing a decrease in the re-integration rate compared to the short term (see Figure 9 below).
Figure 9. Change in re-integration rates per case (short term vs long term)
Source: Commission internal EGF Database
According to the results of the online EGF beneficiary survey carried out by the external evaluators, 42% of beneficiaries indicated that the EGF helped them find a permanent job, and 28% said it helped them find a temporary job, amounting to a total re-integration rate of 70%. Also 42% of beneficiaries replied that it would have been much more difficult to find a job without the EGF. There is a certain degree of bias about the results, as half of the beneficiaries were from higher-educated ICT professionals, mostly from Finnish cases. They are not necessarily representative of the experience of all beneficiaries across all EGF cases and countries. A higher response rate from all Member States with EGF cases and among more vulnerable beneficiary groups would probably have delivered different results.
During the public consultation, carried out via the EU’s Have Your Say website, nearly all respondents indicated that the actions supported by the EGF helped redundant workers to find employment. A majority of respondents positively assessed the way the EGF catered to the needs of beneficiaries, through more targeted and personalised measures than via national policy instruments. However, only 15 of the 39 respondents were aware of the EGF.
A counterfactual impact evaluation (CIE) was carried out by the external evaluators for two EGF cases in order to measure the EGF’s impact on the re-integration rates of beneficiaries compared to those who did not receive EGF support. The CIE compared the re-integration results of the treatment group (EGF beneficiaries) for two cases against a control group (a sample of similar size, consisting of persons with a similar background in terms of age, gender, educational background). The short-term results for both cases were generally inconclusive. In the long term, however, in one of the two cases, from the Netherlands, among those still without work after 12 months, those receiving EGF support ended up finding jobs 1.8 times faster than those who did not receive this support. This indicated that the EGF has been successful in providing assistance to people experiencing longer-term unemployment, thus to those who need it most, and also that the EGF adds value over and above what can be done at national level alone.
It is unclear whether the EGF had significant impacts on beneficiaries compared to what could have been achieved through alternative labour market measures at national or regional level. Although limited quantitative evidence is available, there are many examples in which the EGF results exceed those achieved through mainstream national labour market measures.
As mentioned above, a new method used to compare outcomes, the CIE, provided some useful insights about the long-term effects of EGF intervention. Several stakeholders interviewed indicated that comparing re-integration outcomes with suitable comparators proved to be challenging in the absence of baseline indicators such as case-specific targets like quantitative re-employment objectives included in EGF applications. Such a comparison must take into account the skills of the targeted workers and the economic situation in order to make sense. However, in most cases detailed knowledge about participants is available only when people actually register for EGF measures, not when preparing the application.
Other effects of the EGF support
Further evidence was gathered from the online EGF beneficiary survey, which showed that beyond the re-integration rates, the EGF has broader impacts on beneficiaries’ general employability, such as new skills (77% of respondents), self-confidence gained (62%), increased motivation, reduced stress and new networks of contacts (59%). These less tangible, unexpected results of the EGF support are difficult to measure, considering the lack of medium- to long-term monitoring. The effectiveness of EGF support is measured only through the re-integration rates and there is no requirement for quantitative re-integration objectives in an EGF application.
Among the EGF beneficiaries who responded to the survey, the views on EGF benefits were overwhelmingly positive.
b.Availability of support for all eligible beneficiaries
One of the objectives of the EGF is to concentrate on the most vulnerable groups, especially disadvantaged, older and young unemployed persons by offering measures to stimulate them to remain in or return to the labour market.
Examples of good practice were found in German and Finnish EGF cases, with measures tailored to disadvantaged or vulnerable groups. In Germany, these measures included group formats fostering voluntary work and social exchange; young trainees of the dismissing company could continue their apprenticeships in other companies, while in Finland specific coaching was offered to persons with a partial disability to work.
In the EGF application, Member States are required to include information about any specific category of measure for vulnerable groups or people with a longstanding health problem or disability, or members of a recognised minority. Such information is usually collected when the redundant workers/NEETs sign up for EGF measures and the information about the profiles or backgrounds becomes known.
The EGF applications provide insight only about the targeted beneficiaries’ age group and gender, and whether or not they are EU citizens. Across all 49 cases, the majority of targeted workers are male (70% of all targeted workers) and in the 25–54 age group (74%). This result is explainable because in most EGF cases dismissed workers came from predominantly male-dominated industries (e.g. motor vehicles). In most EGF cases, information about the gender of the dismissed workers is not available. However, where such data are available, there is no discrepancy between the percentage of men and women targeted and those dismissed.
The results for NEETs were generally positive. Although targeted only in a small number of EGF cases (12 out of 49), in those cases the young people targeted took up to a large degree the help offered (about 62%), which provided them assistance they would not have received through national mainstream services. However, the key challenge in supporting NEETs was engaging and activating them, as they are more difficult to identify and connect with and because their needs are different from those of redundant workers.
Based on the information available, the EGF is flexible enough to provide tailored support to different groups; in some cases, specific support was included for vulnerable groups. However, the lack of data collection at the application stage and adequate points of comparison for measuring achievements makes it difficult to assess and draw firm conclusions about the EGF’s effectiveness in offering support to all eligible beneficiaries.
Extent to which support corresponds to needs and profiles of beneficiaries
There is widespread agreement across all stakeholder groups that the EGF is adequately tailored to the specific needs of the relevant target groups. EGF assistance also removed barriers to participation in measures by offering various types of allowance such as job search, training, and returning to study allowances (see below Use of EGF by Member States). In the public consultation, the majority of respondents (12 out of 16) positively assessed the way EGF catered to beneficiaries’ needs, highlighting that it altered the type of support normally available for redundant workers by Member States. According to the EGF beneficiaries’ survey, 69% of respondents agreed that the support they received had been tailored to their needs. Only 18% disagreed, while others were unable to provide a response.
Findings from the case studies show that different practices are used to match the beneficiaries’ needs and profiles with the support offered. In some cases (Belgium, Finland, Ireland), the needs of beneficiaries are identified by sending a targeted survey to each worker prior to designing the EGF measures. In other cases (e.g. France, Italy, Spain, Germany) a profiling and needs assessment is carried out via individual interviews at the start of the EGF implementation.
Interviews at EU level also pointed to an improvement over time in this respect, stating that EGF measures increasingly took into account the socio-economic context, therefore addressing workers’ needs in a holistic way, for example by providing additional support for childcare and benefits during the retraining process (in Spain).
There is substantial variance in the rates of beneficiaries helped and absorption rates across cases, even when taking into account the profiles and needs of beneficiaries (and in most cases also the needs of the labour market and local companies).
The EGF Regulation allows for a certain degree of flexibility to reallocate funds between measures based on needs that may emerge during the implementation period, provided that the total EGF budget is not exceeded. Budgetary flexibility is important and Member States used it for minor reallocations (of less than 20% of the planned budget) during the implementation of about 30% of cases. For reallocations above 20% of the planned budget, Member States must inform the Commission. These, however, have occurred only in about 10% of cases.
Processes for decision-making and implementation of the EGF
In principle, cases may be implemented for a maximum period of 24 months from the date of submission of the application.
Findings show that considerable delays in the start of EGF implementation were experienced in 15 out of 46 cases. The time between a Member State’s submission of an EGF application and the budgetary authority’s approval ranged between 20 weeks and 36 weeks during 2014–2020. These delays were to some extent due to the lengthy and complex application procedure at EU level, but also to the legal constraints and to the way the case was managed at national/regional level.
In practice, Member States often wait to receive formal approval from the budgetary authority before they start implementing the proposed measures. This is because they lack the financial capacity or the willingness to take the risk of starting implementation before the EGF co-financing is secured. This can lead to significant delays and therefore a shorter implementation period.
Reasons for delays in the start of implementation are largely country- and case-specific. Considerable delays were seen for example in Greece (410 days on average) and in Spain (415 days).
The EGF was designed as an emergency response instrument. However, its mobilisation is not as quick as it should be, hindering its effectiveness. Despite this, the delays in mobilisation of the EGF do not mean that the EGF fails to target all the people who would in principle need support after losing their job. Targeting all redundant workers is the regular task of the public employment service or other national authorities. As the EGF aims specifically to target those who need it the most, i.e. the most vulnerable groups of workers made redundant, and to offer this help especially in regions that have been hit particularly hard by restructuring events, these situations rather seem to be pre‑requisites for EGF assistance.
Member States are responsible for the length of the application period and implementation of the EGF measures. In some cases, when Member States provide sufficient information in the application sent to the Commission, the approval procedures can be sped up.
c.Use of the EGF by Member States and by beneficiaries
Overall, not all the funding available under the EGF is used. Between 2014 and 2020, 49 applications were approved, with a total EGF contribution granted of EUR 157.3 million, compared to the EUR 150 million annual ceiling (in 2011 prices).
Being an emergency relief instrument, the EGF is not expected to fully spend its ceiling. Moreover, it needs a comfortable safety margin in order to be prepared for worst-case scenarios of mass redundancies. During times of stability and economic growth, it is expected that far less than the ceiling is used. As with all emergency relief instruments, it is not possible to accurately estimate the amount of assistance needed in a given year.
However, it is important to consider the reasons why some Member States did not apply for the EGF support and whether there could have been more possible cases. Evidence collected in the context of this evaluation confirmed previously identified barriers and identified a few other issues.
·Many Member States did not experience great job losses due to globalisation or the financial and economic crisis, or had limited institutional capacity or limited experience in applying for or implementing EGF cases. This was the case particularly in central and eastern Europe and was largely confirmed by EGF contact persons in Member States that did not apply during 2014-2020. Especially Member States with limited experience applying for EGF support have difficulties in demonstrating the link between redundancies and globalisation or a crisis, or in demonstrating, under the criteria of small labour markets or exceptional circumstances, that the redundancies have a significant impact on the local or regional labour market.
·The other issues identified were a degree of overlap between the EGF and other EU instruments (such as the European Social Fund), or with national measures. Despite design differences between the EGF and the ESF, Member States with a higher ESF co‑financing rate in less developed regions were more reluctant to apply for EGF. The majority of countries that did apply for EGF co-financing had an ESF co-financing rate of 60% or less, thus making EGF support more attractive.
·The timing of the redundancies. Many major redundancies happen over a timeframe longer than what is set out in the EGF Regulation (4 or 9 months) and very often they occur in waves. In order to target most redundancies, Member States might need to submit several applications, depending on the timing of the dismissals.
Identifying how many other restructuring events might have been eligible for EGF is challenging because of the limited data sources available. The European Restructuring Monitor remains the most comprehensive source of data for recorded announcements of redundancies. However, the timeframe of the redundancies is not always indicated. The ERM could serve as one indicator, but more comparative data are needed to draw conclusions. A few Member States permanently scan the market for new possible EGF cases, but most do not.
Use of EGF by Member States
As detailed in Chapter 3, 12 Member States applied for and received EGF support, covering a total of 49 cases. In 46 of those cases, the final report was submitted before the supporting study was sent to the Commission.
The specific labour market measures and allowances offered to both redundant workers and NEETs differ considerably in scope and volume. The measures and allowances most commonly offered and taken up are set out below
·Job search assistance and case management – this is quite broad, as it includes general information services to workers/NEETs, career guidance, advisory services, mentoring and outplacement assistance. These measures were offered in 48 out of 49 cases, targeting in total 68 021 workers and NEETs, for a total budget of EUR 69.3 million. The results from 46 final reports showed that these measures were provided to about 50 917 beneficiaries, for a total amount of about EUR 49.3 million.
·Training and retraining – this was offered in 45 cases and helped 73% of beneficiaries. This measure ranges from vocational training to full university degrees and to language courses, etc. A total of 25 800 workers and NEETs were targeted by this measure, for a total budget of EUR 80.7 million. This measure was provided to 16 595 beneficiaries, for a total amount of about EUR 44 million.
·Promotion of entrepreneurship – this was offered in 35 cases and helped 48% of beneficiaries on average. This measure includes guidance and advice for self-employment through workshops, individual assistance in the creation of companies, tutoring meetings and mentoring activities. In total, 5 235 workers and NEETs were targeted, for a total planned budget of about EUR 32.6 million. This measure was provided to 2 460 beneficiaries, for a total amount spent of about EUR 26.2 million.
·Less commonly used measures are sheltered and supported employment and rehabilitation, and direct job creation. These measures targeted 1 068 workers and NEETs for the first measure, and 200 for the latter, with spending at EUR 5.5 million and EUR 3 million respectively. The first measure was offered in three EGF cases and helped 275 beneficiaries (of 1 068 targeted), for about EUR 1.4 million spent. The direct job creation measure was offered in one case, where it helped 9 beneficiaries (of 200 targeted). In most cases, this relatively low rate was due to people finding a job without support, or a lack of interest to participate due to low willingness for change. ‘Other’ measures included cooperation activities like an enterprise survey and company visits.
·Allowances offered were mainly job search allowances, training allowances, subsistence allowances and mobility allowances. Job search allowances were targeted at 14 691 persons across 25 cases, training allowances at 11 822 persons across 21 cases, mobility allowances at 2 954 persons across 23 cases, and subsistence allowances at 5 306 persons across seven cases. Employers’ recruitment incentives, consisting of pay subsidies to encourage local companies to hire EGF beneficiaries, were used in 12 cases. Other allowances offered (in six cases) include allowances to return to studies, careers allowances and an allowance to access internet in one’s home. As for beneficiaries helped, training allowances had the highest average rate (65%), followed by job search allowances (64%), subsistence allowances (63%) and mobility allowances (33%). The main reason for the low take-up of mobility allowances is the low willingness for mobility among beneficiaries.
The EGF is complementing regular measures by increasing the level of aid, as confirmed by the stakeholder consultations. In many cases, EGF assistance removed barriers to participation in regular (or EGF) measures as assistance was offered for travel, accommodation, childcare or course material facilities. This was also confirmed by the evidence collected for the supporting study.
Use of the EGF for beneficiaries
Case research, including beneficiary surveys, identified considerable differences across EGF cases and Member States in the rate of beneficiaries helped (defined as the ratio of persons assisted over the number of persons targeted). The differences are mostly due to case-specific or country-specific factors. The take-up of EGF measures by beneficiaries is largely dependent on personal and contextual circumstances, although the way in which the measures are designed and implemented also play a role. Among the reasons that led to fewer people participating in the measures offered are:
ostrong national/local support systems that reduce the need for additional EGF support;
ogenerous compensation and training opportunities offered by the dismissing company;
odelays in the start of implementation of EGF measures (so that beneficiaries had already found employment – this also implies, however, that EGF assistance might not have been needed);
ofinding a job sooner than expected; highly-skilled people did not require much support;
ostrong labour markets enabling quick re-integration without EGF support;
opersonal reasons for beneficiaries not wanting to take part (e.g. poor public transportation possibilities, caring for family members, etc.);
olack of knowledge that measures actually exist (implying that the national authorities were not able to identify possible beneficiaries, and/or did not put enough effort into guidance measures); and
omeasures not being regarded as useful (implying that the package of measures was designed without closely involving the beneficiaries).
In total, across the 46 EGF cases analysed, 37 072 workers and 2 524 NEETs have been assisted (i.e. 39 596 beneficiaries in total). The rate of beneficiaries helped ranged from a low of 9% to a high of 113%.
As explained above, the results of the beneficiary surveys indicated that the EGF support was perceived as very effective by most respondents and that the support they received was tailored to their needs. Dissatisfaction rates are case-specific, and also vary widely within countries. Most of the reported dissatisfaction stems from the fact that measures offered turned out not to be of the expected quality. However, in a few instances, a mismatch between measures offered and beneficiaries’ needs hindered participation.
Little information is available on the specific characteristics of the beneficiaries targeted beyond gender and age group. Out of 49 562 persons targeted (workers and NEETs), 31 797 were men. This had been addressed in a study for the European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality. As mentioned in the mid-term evaluation of the 2014–2020 EGF, the figures reflect the gender segregation of jobs, and the fact that industries prone to larger restructuring because of globalisation, especially manufacturing, are predominantly male industries. However, this is case-dependent. There are also cases from the retail sector with a far larger number of female workers made redundant than men.
Use of the EGF support for NEETs
During 2014–2020, NEETs were targeted in only 12 out of the 49 cases, by 5 countries, accounting for 8.4% of all persons targeted through the EGF (4 099 NEETs out of 49 562 persons targeted). The conditions for supporting NEETs under the EGF were different during 2014–2017 and 2018–2020. In 2018, Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 revised the NEETs clause and extended it until 31 December 2020.
During 2014–2017, 19 Member States could potentially qualify for assistance targeted towards NEETs
. To include NEETs in an EGF case, at least some of the redundancies must have happened in a region eligible under the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI). The possibility has been used by Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Spain. However, these countries included NEETs in only a few of their EGF applications. Spain could have included NEETs in all applications, but preferred not to do so, as its co-financing rate under the YEI was far more favourable (at 93%) than the EGF co-financing rate.
During 2018–2020, the inclusion of NEETs in an EGF case became possible if at least some of the redundancies happened in a region with at least 20% youth unemployment. Only 2 Member States included NEETs in their applications under the new conditions: 1 application was submitted by Portugal in 2018 and 1 by Belgium in 2019 (which was rejected by the Council).
In 2014–2020, the rate of NEETs helped ranged from 39% to 100%. Average rates of NEETs helped were particularly high in Ireland (91%) and Greece (85%), whereas Belgium struggled to engage with this target group (47%). Findings showed that the existence of the YEI alongside the EGF created a degree of ‘competition’ and information retention between operators; this meant that time was required to establish trust and participation so that young people could be adequately targeted and involved in the EGF projects.
The limited use of EGF support for NEETs can be partly explained by the perception that the EGF is not the best avenue to target these young people and that other EU instruments (such as the YEI) are better suited for this type of support. However, in those cases where EGF support to NEETs was used, it was considered a key added value of the EGF (this was the case in Ireland). Also, in Belgium, the EGF allowed for experimentation with new types of support for this target group by extending the classic national support system to NEETs.
See Annex 4 for figures per case on the NEETs targeted and assisted.
d.Monitoring and reporting
Under the EGF Regulation, Member States include in the application the number of persons targeted, broken down by gender and age group. Member States send to the Commission a final report 6 months after the end of the personalised measures, indicating the case’s outcome, including the beneficiaries’ employment status. Reporting about the beneficiaries is limited to their number, broken down by gender and age, and to the categories of workers. The Commission implementing decisions also require Member States to deliver data on the employment status of beneficiaries a year after the final report.
The effectiveness of the EGF support is measured only through the re-integration rates. There is no requirement for quantitative re-integration objectives in an EGF application, which makes it difficult to measure and monitor the effectiveness of EGF support, because there is no baseline against which results can be compared. This was also pointed out in the mid-term evaluation of the 2014–2020 EGF
.
According to interviewees at EU level, progress on case-specific objectives is poorly monitored by Member States. The findings from the case studies show that in many cases there are no specific systems to keep track of the results beyond the end date of the EGF measures. Among the reasons for this are privacy concerns (e.g. Sweden) or most often because only the minimum information is collected for the employment status report, as mentioned above. Beyond the challenges related to privacy, there seems to be little burden associated with monitoring the results. Only Germany and France reported a burden in this context, while Belgium suggested that more monitoring should take place, including more qualitative results such as beneficiaries’ satisfaction, improved skills and self-confidence.
The 2021–2027 EGF Regulation includes specific common indicators and a beneficiary survey to monitor implementation and measure impact. The final report to be submitted by Member States will include not only re-employment rates, but also some qualitative information, such as the qualifications gained at the end of the operations. This should improve the monitoring of EGF effectiveness in the future. The Commission’s proposal to set case-specific targets and to include reporting by type of employment was not included in the final agreement of Parliament and the Council on the EGF Regulation for the 2021–2027 period.
e.Factors contributing to or hindering the achievement of objectives
The external experts performed a thorough qualitative analysis of the information available to identify which factors help or hinder the achievement of EGF cases’ objectives. This analysis was primarily based on the case reports and on interviews with case stakeholders. It confirmed the factors already identified in the mid-term evaluation and the Commission’s biennial reports, and added additional factors.
The success factors contributing to the effectiveness of the EGF are:
·The Member State’s past experience in EGF implementation and the institutional capacity to adopt a coordinated approach with all relevant stakeholders seems to be an important success factor. The success of EGF cases also benefits from building on existing partnerships and delivery structures for employment and social policies, together with a solid social dialogue.
·Tailored measures to the individual needs of beneficiaries. The EGF allows for intensive, individualised support, usually much more than national or regional measures. Member States can experiment via the EGF with innovative measures and, if proven successful, they integrate them into the regular measures of national or local authorities or of the dismissing enterprise.
·Availability of support services in close proximity to the target group. For example, in Spain and Belgium EGF offices and reconversion units were set up in locations close to the target groups.
·Provision of support by a small group of implementers. In Sweden, the case was managed by a small group of PES staff with a better understanding of the needs of the target group. In Spain, a relationship was established between the case counsellors and the beneficiaries, who established a joint WhatsApp group and remain in contact today.
·Background of workers and willingness to actively participate in EGF measures. Workers with higher levels of education or with more versatile and transferable skills are likely to find new employment faster than the lower skilled.
All these success factors reinforce the idea that personalised, individualised support services are highly beneficial for finding a quality job. However, success factors are largely case-specific, and there are factors that cannot be controlled, such as the economic situation in the country/region, the supply and demand for labour and the unemployment rate.
Factors hindering the effectiveness of the EGF are:
·Issues related to the profiles of beneficiaries, e.g. age, low levels of education or limited knowledge of the local language. Age is a commonly reported factor hindering the reach of the EGF. Older people face greater challenges than younger people. Redundant workers close to retirement age tend to be less inclined to participate in EGF measures. This is the case when they are eligible for early retirement or for generous unemployment benefits to bridge the gap until retirement, or when their job loss had a considerable impact on their mental state and their self-confidence in being able to secure a new job.
·Difficulties in reaching and activating redundant workers and NEETs. In many Member States, privacy issues have made it difficult to reach the specific people who are going to be dismissed, as in some cases (mainly sectoral) enterprises do not disclose the information about these workers. Also, NEETs were often difficult to reach and engage with, and they did not always consider the measures made available to them relevant and interesting.
·Workers’ low willingness for mobility and change. Depending on the case specifics, reasons for this included proximity to the work place and home, scepticism about the EGF project, reluctance to switch career paths, and workers’ rigid expectations regarding their potential new job. Member States partially mitigated these challenges with workshops focusing on willingness for change and mobility and also with travel grants.
·Problems and delays with designing and implementing EGF measures. These included delays in the selection of implementing partners and in procurement of training courses; submission of an application long after the reference period for redundancies; long and complicated national procedures; weak institutional capabilities and design of policy instruments; limited cooperation between stakeholders and capacity to implement innovative measures of interest to beneficiaries.
f.Involvement of companies and social partners
As already identified in the mid-term evaluation of the 2014–2020 EGF, notable success factors for EGF cases included the development of effective partnerships and appropriate delivery mechanisms, strong cooperation between the delivery partners, including social partners, and a coordinated approach
. This was largely confirmed by the supporting study through case research.
The degree of involvement of social partners and companies in the design and provision of coherent support packages varies across Member States and cases, as it is largely based on their regular support systems. Some examples from case studies showed that either social partners are involved early on in the restructuring negotiations, with the public employment service coming in as a secondary actor, or companies laying off workers are required by law to be involved in implementing active labour market measures, which they contribute to both financially and with personnel.
Generally, it is clear that the involvement of former employers boosts the effectiveness of EGF cases. In Finland, it was found that when companies are involved in implementing EGF measures, it helps with the provision of information and measures for guiding beneficiaries back into the labour market as soon as possible.
The involvement of social partners is also generally very well received. However, some issues were encountered relating to the involvement of companies and social partners.
g.Information and communication activities
The EGF Regulation requires Member States to provide information on and publicise the funded actions, highlight the role of the EU, and ensure that the EGF contribution is visible. It also requires the Commission to maintain and regularly update an internet website, provide information on the EGF, and provide guidance on the submission of applications, as well as information on all applications.
At Member State level, for successful communication on the EGF cases, all relevant stakeholders at national, regional and/or local level need to be aware of the opportunities available from the EGF. Findings showed, however, that in some Member States there is higher awareness of the EGF if social partners participated in delivering some of the measures. In other Member States, not all relevant stakeholders are aware of the EGF and its potential benefits.
The survey of 13 Member States who did not apply during 2014–2020 found that the general level of knowledge about the EGF is low. As reported in the public consultation, workers’ organisations in Germany, Finland, Belgium and Spain were generally aware of the EGF, but workers were not. The same results emerged from the survey to EGF beneficiaries. The main objective of the communication activities is to inform participants about the EU intervention. This is usually done during or after implementation because in the initial stages (i.e. before formal approval from the budgetary authority), the measures are implemented using national funds and there is little visibility of the EGF.
The Member States are responsible for providing information about the EGF and choosing the best suited communication actions. However, this is not done to the same degree in all cases. While many of the Member States have created dedicated EGF websites to provide information about every EGF project and the workers are informed about the role of the EU in the support they receive, the findings show that Member States were consistently underspending the budget planned for information and publicity activities. In some cases the information and publicity costs were absorbed by the Member States outside of the EGF framework, or costs were simply lower than expected.
The involvement of social partners and companies in the design and implementation of EGF measures was helpful in reaching (potential) beneficiaries, as their contact details are otherwise not known. For example, in Finland an online portal was established by the dismissing company (Microsoft) to communicate information about recruitment events and vacancies. In Sweden, a contact centre was established at the Volvo Trucks plant where the majority of the target group had previously been working.
Little feedback was collected from beneficiaries on the usefulness and effectiveness of communication activities, although evidence of the lack of awareness shows that there is room for improvement.
At EU level, the EGF website is constantly updated with information about EGF applications, EGF publications (the biennial report, the frequently asked questions, press releases, etc.), events and news. Twice a year, the Commission organises EGF contact persons meetings and EGF networking seminars, to discuss issues of common interest. Views on their usefulness and effectiveness, however, are mixed. The majority of Member States consulted were of the opinion felt that the EGF networking seminars had been useful, as they allowed for knowledge sharing, and cross-fertilisation of new ideas and experiences, but are not used to their full potential. Recently, the Commission also started sharing information via social media (Twitter). Nevertheless, there is always scope to do more in this respect.
h.Overall impact of the EGF
Overall, it is difficult to draw robust conclusions about the impact of the EGF, especially at case level where implementation and results depend heavily on the specificities of the labour market and the target group, and because the results are not monitored and reported on in an accurate and comparable way. Nevertheless, evidence indicated a clear positive impact. The results of the CIE also pointed to the EGF having a positive influence on beneficiaries’ likelihood to find a job, especially in the long term (after 12 or more months of unemployment).
The EGF has been successful in providing targeted emergency support adapted to the needs of dismissed workers, while ensuring enough flexibility for the support to be integrated into Member States’ national systems, including through highly individualised and tailored support measures. A significant number of beneficiaries have been re-integrated into the labour market, and even those who were not have likely gained new skills, qualifications or social networks. On top of this, the lessons learned from the design and implementation have been used to improve support to workers in the future. The Fund has shown solidarity towards workers and NEETs alike, and supported them in finding sustainable employment.
In the Member States, the use of the EGF has improved overall awareness about the Fund among authorities at national, regional and local level (depending on who is involved). In Member States with previous experience and delivery mechanisms, the EGF serves as a tool to test innovative measures, which could later be mainstreamed in employment and social policies.
Several lessons have been learned from the implementation. At Member State level, lessons were learned about the application process, design, early start and accessibility of the measures. At EU level, lessons were learned about the design of the Fund, the need for more or different data collection, about how more flexibility is needed in adapting the funded measures and about the need to improve communication activities (see lessons learned in Chapter 6).
5.2.EFFICIENCY
The efficiency criterion analyses to what extent the costs associated with the implementation of the Fund were justified considering the results (defined as the rate of re-integration of beneficiaries). It also analyses if there are any inefficiencies or unnecessary burdens at case or instrument level that should be addressed to improve the Fund’s efficiency in the future. The analysis was made at both case and Member State level.
a.Efficiency at case level
According to the stakeholder consultations, the amounts available for the measures are considered to be sufficient. Most respondents to the public consultation believed that the same results could not have been achieved with less resources or in a shorter period of time.
The average absorption rate of the 46 EGF cases was 59%, with the lowest observed rate being approximately 2% and the highest 100%. The absorption rate varies significantly between Member States (see Figure 10 below), sectors, cases and different measures and activities. It is very case-specific and not necessarily indicative of good or bad case implementation.
Reasons for discrepancies include:
·an overestimation of budgets by Member States and the inclusion of high safety margins due to insufficient information on the profiles and needs of potential beneficiaries during the planning stages;
·an overestimation of interested beneficiaries or unforeseen changes (e.g. workers finding a new job on their own, especially when there are delays in implementation); and
·more available funding at Member State level than initially expected, resulting in less EGF co-financing being used.
Figure 10. Average absorption rate per Member State
For each Member State, the number of EGF applications received is in brackets
Source: EGF Database
The cost-efficiency of the EGF considers the degree to which the costs incurred are proportionate to the results (i.e. the number of beneficiaries helped). No concrete conclusions could be drawn on the degree to which the results per beneficiary were cost-efficient. This is because the resources spent per case, and the number of beneficiaries helped as a result, differed considerably by case, sector and Member State. Comparing results across cases is irrelevant because of the specificities of each case.
In the majority of the 46 cases, the actual cost per worker was lower than initially planned. From the comparison of the absorption rate of EGF funds (the percentage of the spending of the assistance granted) and the rate of beneficiaries assisted, it was clear that the large majority of cases were more cost-efficient than initially planned. In other words, in 80% of EGF cases, each euro of EGF funds helped more people than planned in the initial budget. In addition to the current average re-employment rate of 65% there is empirical evidence from the RHOMOLO-IO simulations performed on 23 EGF cases from 2014–2015, which suggests that the Fund has positive indirect effects, as each additional job created influences other sectors positively. The findings were that the dimension of these indirect impacts varies across case studies, ranging from a minimum of 20% up to 50% of the total jobs generated.
At Member State level, after comparing the total EGF amount granted per Member State against the number of beneficiaries assisted, it was found that the general trend is that more beneficiaries were assisted in countries that received more EGF funding. A higher number of beneficiaries requires more financial resources (see Figure 11).
Figure 11. Relationship between total EGF amounts spent and number of beneficiaries helped, per Member State
Source: EGF Database
The analysis of the EGF final reports and the case studies shows that a higher cost per beneficiary is influenced by the cost of the measures and by the number of participants. Variations in cost-efficiency result from a range of factors. These include the scale of the layoffs, the labour market situation, the targeted beneficiaries’ individual circumstances and skills, alternative measures already provided by the Member State, the services’ cost, the number of beneficiaries helped and how easy or difficult it was for them to be re-employed after participation in EGF measures. This was also noted by the Commission in its 2017 and 2019 biennial reports on the EGF.
At sectoral level, no analysis is possible. However, average cost per beneficiary at sectoral level varies considerably, with the clear outliers being air transport (an average cost of EUR 4 833 per beneficiary) and call centres (average cost of EUR 571 per beneficiary).
Cost-effectiveness looks at the relationship between costs and results, i.e. the number of beneficiaries re-integrated. In some cases, cost savings resulted from networks and processes already established from previous EGF cases.
Case research did not reveal any correlation between the level of absorption and the re-employment rate. This re-confirms similar findings from the ex post evaluation of the 2007–2013 EGF.
As the mid-term evaluation of the 2014–2020 EGF pointed out, the case studies also showed that many of the implementation costs (i.e. managing and monitoring costs) are fixed, independently of the size of the case. The reporting of such expenditure as a percentage of the total of the overall EGF assistance granted is frequently seen as not giving a fair picture. This is because smaller cases that incur more or less the same costs as larger ones inevitably look ‘inefficient’ as the percentage of implementing costs is a higher part of the total.
Evidence suggests that there is room for efficiency gains. The main inefficiencies are related to processes or procedures at national and/or regional level, which lengthen the timeframe. Some examples of inefficiencies are issues with the procurement of training courses or partnerships established with delays.
As a general rule, EGF assistance is more costly than regular measures. However, according to the final reports and employment status reports for the EGF cases, EGF assistance leads to higher re-employment rates. An educated judgement as to whether additional costs are justified or not would also require further study of the societal costs of lower re-employment rates. This was also confirmed by the mid-term evaluation of the 2014–2020 EGF.
b.Efficiency at instrument level
Most stakeholders interviewed and most respondents to the public consultation indicated that the decision-making process is still considered lengthy and complex. Despite this, efficiency improves the more applications a Member State submits, thanks to lessons learned. There is little scope to reduce the length and complexity of the application process, as approval by the budgetary authority is required. The Regulation covering the 2014–2020 period imposed time limits: 20 weeks for the Commission to process the applications and 6 weeks for the budgetary authority to approve.
On average, across the 49 EGF cases approved during the 2014–2020 period, the process from the Member State’s application until approval by the budgetary authority took 202 days (29 weeks). The shortest application period was 141 days (20 weeks) and the longest 254 days (36 weeks). Approval by the budgetary authority took an average of 63 days (nine weeks) for the entire process. The six-week deadline was met in only 10 of the 49 cases.
This shows that further efforts are needed to shorten the length of procedures. This finding already included in the EGF mid-term evaluation, was incorporated into the 2021-2027 EGF Regulation, with shorter deadlines for the Commission and Member States and without the need for Member States to demonstrate in applications the cause of the redundancies. However, the proposal to simplify the interinstitutional decision-making process on the mobilisation of the EGF was not accepted by the budgetary authority.
Based on the Commission’s experience in dealing with EGF applications, the most promising avenue to increase efficiency is to remove the documentation requirements on the analysis of globalisation or crisis criteria. Member States could save significant resources (time and money) when filing an application, and the Commission’s time to analyse an application would also be reduced. This simplification is included in the 2021–2027 EGF Regulation.
The publication by the Commission in May 2017 of the EGF frequently asked questions (FAQs) proved useful for Member States. The FAQs contain answers that serve as assistance and guidance during all the stages of an EGF case.
5.3.COHERENCE
The coherence criterion looks at how well the EGF intervention works together with other EU policies and initiatives (particularly the ESF) and with national instruments that have similar aims. This is done in particular by analysing complementarity at both instrument and case level, overlaps or duplication, and measures taken to avoid this or to ensure complementarity.
a.Complementarity with other EU policies and initiatives
Most stakeholders agree that EGF complements the ESF in the area of employment policies by offering a reactive one-off support following specific restructuring events, in a more tailored, flexible and intensive manner than the ESF. The ESF has been designed to offer a more long-term approach, which also makes it possible to anticipate structural change, in contrast to the short-term one-off support offered by the EGF. The EGF is mobilised on a needs basis, when Member States require financial support to help dismissed workers, thus adding value. However, there is scope to better align the EGF and the ESF, as some Member States choose to fund EGF-type measures using the ESF because of the higher co-financing rate.
In the public consultation, nearly all respondents indicated that the EGF was strongly coherent with other support measures available at the EU level. However, in the survey aimed at Member States that did not apply for EGF co-financing during 2014–2020, more than half (8/13) indicated that they did not apply because the ESF was more favourable, easier and faster to mobilise in their country.
An extensive study was published in 2018 on the coherence, complementarity and coordination of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIFs) and between various other instruments such as the EGF. According to this study, the EGF complements the ESF in its objective to improve employment opportunities, strengthen social inclusion and promote education, skills and life-long learning.
The conditions to support the NEETs are similar via the EGF and the YEI, indicating a need for greater coherence between the programmes. The EGF does not require a link to be established between the NEETs and the redundancies, beyond at least some of the redundancies being in the same region, thus creating a degree of overlap – almost all NEETs who can be targeted through the EGF can also be targeted through the YEI. Given that the YEI specifically targets NEETs, and the limited use of the EGF for this purpose during 2014–2020, the YEI is the most appropriate tool for this type of support.
The Finnish authorities pointed out some synergies with EURES (the European job mobility portal, part of the EU Programme for Employment and Social Innovation) to improve international labour mobility for EGF cases. In Finland, the unemployment rate of immigrants is much higher also among highly educated professionals, and the work done with the EURES network of PES offices helped laid-off persons of other nationalities avoid social exclusion. The measures included helping some of the redundant workers find a job in other Member States. Measures promoting international labour mobility had been offered to a limited extent in other cases, but they have not been taken up due to limited labour mobility.
b.Complementarity with national measures and instruments
In general, the EGF is flexible enough to adapt to the national contexts, although there are considerable differences between national support frameworks for the unemployed. Also, the EGF supports, complements and adds to measures or activities funded by national instruments. The EGF is well integrated into existing delivery models or models established for the EGF and operating within the mainstream frameworks. All 16 national authorities that responded to the public consultation and the mid-term evaluation of the 2014-2020 EGF confirmed this conclusion.
In Member States with EGF cases during 2014-2020, no inconsistencies were observed. On the contrary, the EGF was widely considered as complementary to national support structures. In many cases, the EGF adds to what can normally be implemented in a Member State (e.g. through more intensive support because more funds are available, or by making it possible for beneficiaries to choose from a tailor-made array of training courses that is broader than those usually offered at national level).
In some cases the EGF is coordinated with the recommendations set out in the EU Quality Framework for anticipation of change and restructuring (QFR), which is the EU policy instrument setting a framework of best practice for anticipating and dealing with corporate restructuring. However, this is not indicated in the EGF applications (see lessons learned in Chapter 6).
In some cases, the EGF intervention was part of a wider policy framework aimed at minimising the consequences of mass redundancies in a region. The EGF addressed the short-term employment consequences of the restructuring event and was implemented alongside a wider and longer-term economic growth plan for the area or region. This not only ensured coherence between the activities implemented by other regional and local stakeholders, but also amplified the sustainability of the EGF’s results.
5.4.RELEVANCE
The evaluation of relevance covers three core aspects: the continued appropriateness and usefulness of the scope of the EGF; its intervention criteria; and the extent to which the inclusion of NEETs in EGF cases met Member States’ needs.
a.Relevance of the scope of the EGF
The scope of the EGF relates to the causes that trigger redundancy events. By the end of 2020, the EGF could only be mobilised if the redundancies had been caused by either trade-related globalisation or a global financial and economic crisis. During the 2014–May 2020 period, there were 30 EGF cases (61%) relating to globalisation, and 19 (39%) linked to a global financial and economic crisis.
The number of EGF applications has always been cyclical and correlated with the general trend in employment and the economic realities in Member States. Between 2018 and 2020, only 11 EGF applications were submitted, as European economies had recovered from the 2008 crisis, there were less large-scale restructuring events, and Member States were better equipped to deal with major restructuring events.
Since March 2020, the COVID-19 crisis caused a surge in job losses; this is likely to continue to cause business closures and job losses across Europe in 2021. At the end of 2020, four EGF applications had been received as a result of the COVID-19 crisis.
Different stakeholders, at EU level and in the Member States, pointed out that linking the need for EGF funds to the impact of globalisation has proven challenging for several applicant Member States. This has led in many cases to several revisions of the same application, resulting in efficiency losses in terms of time spent and staff involved in the application process. Further evidence is the fact that in 2019 one EGF application (EGF/2019/001 BE/Carrefour) was rejected because the Council perceived the link to major structural changes in trade patterns due to globalisation to be too weak.
A few Member States indicated through the public consultation and the online survey that the scope should be expanded to include layoffs resulting from more general restructuring events stemming from automation and digitisation. In the set-up for 2014–2020, the EGF excluded redundancies generated by intra-EU trade and offshoring within the EU, and did not account for job losses driven by digitisation and automation that were not linked to globalisation or a global financial and economic crisis.
Globalisation has changed dramatically since the first design of the EGF. While globalisation, automation and offshoring were traditional causes for job losses, in recent years other trends are putting a strain on virtually all economic sectors. This includes demographic ageing, the shift towards a low-carbon economy, a decrease in the need for low-skilled labour and an increasing need for digital skills resulting from a general trend towards digitalisation.
The 2021–2027 EGF Regulation includes such recent trends by extending the scope to any large-scale restructuring event such as intra-EU nearshoring, digitalisation, transition to low-carbon economy, etc., thus striving to leave no one behind. Decisions for EGF co-financing will be based on the expected impact of the redundancies, rather than their cause. This results in more flexibility for Member States to target the needs of dismissed workers. Based on the evidence collected, this would fulfil the needs of stakeholders who raised concerns that the scope of the EGF was no longer fully appropriate and that it should be expanded.
b.Relevance of the intervention criteria of the EGF
The intervention criteria relate to the number of redundancies that occurred in a single enterprise or an economic sector. In case of redundancies in a particular economic sector, the emphasis is on allowing applications combining redundancies in SMEs operating in the same sector. Among the 49 cases covered by this evaluation, 27 concerned redundancies in a single enterprise, 13 were sectoral applications, and 9 used the derogation clause.
The threshold had been lowered from 1 000 redundancies in the 2007–2013 period to 500 in 2014–2020. Among the 49 cases covered by this evaluation, 21 concerned restructuring events involving less than 1 000 redundancies, which means that the lower threshold definitely triggered more applications.
As underlined in the mid-term evaluation of the 2014-2020 EGF and re-confirmed by most Member States, the thresholds for redundancies were considered too high and acted as barriers for applying for EGF funding. Among the countries that did apply for EGF in 2014–2020, only Ireland was consistently unable to meet the threshold of 500 dismissals. Nevertheless, even in Germany, a country where large-scale redundancies are most common, authorities suggested that lowering the threshold for redundancies should be considered as it is too limiting.
Several Member States and stakeholders indicated that the EGF’s accessibility would be improved by adapting the dismissal period to avoid the exclusion of workers falling outside the four or nine-month reference period.
Finally, from the interviews with national authorities some argued that the Fund’s relevance was hindered by the requirement for EGF cases involving multiple companies (‘sectoral’ cases) to be limited to the same sector. Large companies have developed the capacity to mitigate globalisation changes, whereas SMEs are still heavily affected by globalisation and the consequent restructuring, which warrants a more flexible approach to restructuring events involving more than one company.
In the 2021–2027 EGF Regulation, these three aspects have been addressed. The threshold for dismissals has been reduced to 200 workers and self-employed persons, the reference period for a single company remains the same (4 months) and that for a sector has been reduced to 6 months. A provision was added to make restructuring events involving at least 200 displaced persons in the same or different economic sectors and located in the same region eligible for EGF support.
c.Relevance of the NEETs clause
Youth unemployment in the EU had been steadily decreasing until the recent COVID-19 crisis. Since 2019, in several regions of the EU youth unemployment rates have been above 20%.
During the 2014–2020 period, the EGF was barely used to support NEETs, with only five Member States including support to NEETs in their EGF cases. The existence of other EU instruments supporting NEETs suggests that the EGF might not be the most appropriate instrument for this purpose.
The results of the public consultation show mixed opinions. One third of respondents (6/16) are in favour of the support for NEETs. Three of the six respondents in favour came from Member States which used this derogation. Another third of respondents were against the inclusion of NEETs, arguing that NEETs constituted a different type of target group, requiring a specific and separate set of measures, and pointing out that other specific instruments for youth support already exist.
Among the Member States who had EGF cases and high youth unemployment, some (Italy, France) did not include NEETs in their EGF cases because the group was supported through the YEI or via other national instruments.
The 2021–2027 EGF Regulation acknowledges that other instruments are more suitable for providing assistance to NEETs, notably the ESF+.
5.5.EU ADDED VALUE
The EGF provides added value when compared to what Member States could have achieved alone through national measures targeted at helping workers made redundant. Although several stakeholders consider that some measures can also be funded through the ESF and that NEETs can be supported through the YEI, the EGF provides EU added value.
The results of the public consultation highlight that some 69% of respondents felt that the EGF represents an added value. The majority (85%) of respondents to the beneficiary survey evaluated the EGF favourably in comparison with other sources of support at national/regional level, citing in particular the volume and scope of the EGF support, and it being more tailored to the specific needs of beneficiaries.
The volume effects are defined as effects that show how the EGF has added volume compared to the national measures in place. Based on the case research and on the consultations, the majority of those involved in the delivery of the EGF confirm it has added volume effects to the delivery of services. Four ways in which the EGF adds to volume have been identified and set out below:
·The EGF enabled Member States to help more people than would be the case if they had to rely only on national funds.
·The EGF resources also enabled Member States to devote more time and financial resources to better assessing the beneficiaries’ needs and thus to provide more tailored support. In some countries with higher GDP per capita rates and lower ESF allocations, the EGF added financial support on top of the fixed allocations provided to Member States from the ESF.
·The additional EGF resources resulted in more intensive, targeted support than national measures did. The EGF increased not only the overall number of services, but also their variety.
·The EGF makes it possible in some cases to add to existing active labour market measures already available in the Member States by extending the duration of the specialised services or the volume of support. Some national measures target only those who have been unemployed for a long time (e.g. 6 months to a year).
more people are targeted or there is an expansion of the measures offered compared to what would have been the case without the EGF support. The EGF has considerable scope effects, although this also varied considerably across Member States depending on national support systems.
Secondly, the EGF provides a scope effect, making it possible to provide support to different groups of beneficiaries. Usually, the national PES support targets those furthest from the labour market, e.g. the long-term unemployed or people with particularly low levels of skills and education. In contrast, the EGF allows support to be given all groups of people, from high-skilled workers to workers who are very difficult to place on the job market, need additional support or are lacking essential skills. Nevertheless, this scope effect is linked to the degree that the dismissing companies are involved in the design and implementation of the measures and in providing financial support to the redundant workers. The scope effect in terms of support to NEETs was considered as a key added value of the EGF in Ireland and Belgium.
Role effects relate to the extent to which innovative ideas tested and lessons learned from the implementation were incorporated into the regular package of provisions. These are more likely to become visible in the long term, so limited examples have been identified. In some countries innovations from the EGF have been (or will be in the future) mainstreamed at national level. In Belgium, for instance, over time several innovations have been ‘tested’ in EGF cases, to be mainstreamed into regional or national measures if successful. The EGF experiences have affected the national support services more broadly in Finland, where the national ‘change security model’ was adapted in 2016 to make it obligatory for employers laying off workers to participate in the implementation of labour market measures. In Spain, EGF cases have been used as a reference point in the design of other jobseeker-placement projects and local employment initiatives.
Process effects relate to the general improvement of delivery processes thanks to experiences during EGF implementation. Overall, this is the least common EU added value effect of the EGF, although examples of process effects exist in Finland, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy and Sweden. The EGF fosters cooperation between public- and private-sector stakeholders in the design and delivery of the measures in a way that other EU instruments do not. A process effect in terms of the procedures employed is less common. From the case research, the lessons from the EGF had only been applied to other EGF cases, but they may feed into policy discussions on future changes that would mainstream tested processes into regional or national provisions.
In terms of cross-region and cross-border effects, the evidence collected does not show any such effects.
Very few respondents to the beneficiary survey indicated that the EGF helped them find a temporary job (11/441 respondents) or permanent job (10/441 respondents) outside of their original country of residence. As the implementation of the Fund is left to individual Member States, there is limited cross-border coordination between Member States within the context of the EGF, which might be a limiting factor in producing cross-border effects. Due to limited number of applications, further analysis on the cross-border effects was not possible.
6.Conclusions and lessons-learned
Conclusions
The overarching conclusions set out below are underpinned by evidence collected from the supporting study and from additional reports and studies. The conclusions also provide lessons for the Fund’s implementation and design. The findings and conclusions are considered reasonably robust, even if the results of the public consultation and of the beneficiary survey have to be taken with caution.
On the effectiveness of the EGF, the Fund has successfully met its objective of solidarity towards workers made redundant and self-employed persons whose activity ceased due to restructuring events, while supporting them in re-entering the labour market. However, there are significant differences between cases and Member States. In this process, the EU strives to leave no one behind, and has also shown solidarity towards different groups, especially vulnerable ones, sometimes even improving their sense of belonging to the EU, or their feeling of being listened to at EU level. Beyond re‑integration into the labour market, the EGF has produced long-lasting effects on beneficiaries’ general employability, such as new skills and qualifications, increased self-esteem and new social networks from participating in EGF measures. Beneficiaries’ participation in a personalised orientation process made them feel more proactive, encouraged them to develop their personal and social skills and had a positive effect on their families. Even though this is not the key objective of the Fund, it is likely to help them find sustainable employment in the future.
Overall, the average re-integration rate of redundant workers into the job market improved compared to the previous programming period (from 49% to 60%). This rate depends on case specificities, but also on external factors and personal reasons. A more qualitative approach to evaluating effectiveness is necessary. For reporting purposes, the 2021–2027 EGF Regulation introduced a beneficiary survey to be carried out for each EGF case.
On top of the positive results for the re-integration of beneficiaries, evidence from the RHOMOLO simulations suggests that the EGF has positive indirect effects, as each additional job created influences other sectors in a positive way. The scale of these indirect impacts varies across EGF case studies, ranging from a minimum of 20% up to 50% of the total jobs generated.
There are several reasons influencing beneficiaries’ take-up of EGF measures. These are: (i) external factors such as the labour market situation; (ii) an early and intensive general information package; (iii) an early start to personalised measures; and (iv) continuous adjustment of measures in response to current developments.
The EGF supports all eligible beneficiaries in a more tailored and intensive manner than national measures and other EU instruments do. The EGF measures respond to beneficiaries’ individual needs and wishes, and ensure that all beneficiaries are treated equally. It helps to remove barriers of participation and enables tailored support to be provided to vulnerable and/or disadvantaged groups, e.g. by making available allowances for childcare or elderly care. The flexibility of the Fund in terms of the types of measures is highly appreciated.
EGF measures are always offered on top of regular national measures and/or intensify them. The help offered would otherwise not have been available. This is a clear sign of the complementarity and additionality of EGF measures.
At application stage, it is difficult for Member States to identify the needs and wishes of potential beneficiaries. Sufficient budgetary flexibility is needed to adapt the allocation of funds during the implementation of an EGF case in order to address needs effectively. Although reallocations of funds were possible during the 2014–2020 period and often communicated via the FAQs and EGF contact persons meetings, there seems to have been a lack of knowledge in some countries about this possibility.
The assessment showed that the application process and implementation of EGF cases tend to improve over time as Member States become more knowledgeable and aware of the EGF’s process and potential. However, sometimes finding the right evidence to justify a case is a major challenge and prevents Member States from applying.
A positive effect of the use of EGF assistance is that it fosters the development of a general delivery mechanism of restructuring assistance in Member States with little experience in dealing with mass redundancies. In Member States that can already build on a wealth of experience and delivery mechanisms, the EGF serves as a tool to test innovative measures, which could later be mainstreamed in employment and social policies. In half of the cases, Member States expressed a positive opinion on the guidance received from the European Commission during the application phase.
ESF co-financing rates higher than the EGF co-financing rate of 60% have been a factor discouraging EGF applications.
More data collection and monitoring requirements are needed to evaluate the EGF’s performance. EGF results are measured only in relation to re-integration rates. However, the effects of the Fund go far beyond this, helping beneficiaries acquire new skills, gain qualifications, build up self-confidence and establish social networks, which improve their overall employability.
Other factors influencing the effectiveness of EGF cases are: (i) the level of involvement of social partners and companies laying off workers in the measures’ design and implementation; (ii) the degree to which sufficient information on the possibilities of the Fund is available to workers and NEETs; and (iii) how far national procedures allow for smooth implementation. EGF cases sometimes start with a delay or planned measures cannot be implemented due to administrative issues.
The Commission promoting the use of EGF was considered an asset for the beneficiaries in several cases. In some Member States, there is higher awareness of the EGF if social partners participated in delivering some of the measures, while in other Member States not all relevant stakeholders, including beneficiaries, are aware of the EGF and its potential benefits. There is scope to improve communication and awareness about the EGF among workers and their representative organisations at EU and Member State level.
Analysis of the efficiency of the assistance has shown progress in the absorption rates (i.e. use of the allocated resources) of EGF co-financing, which improved on the previous period, from an average of 55% to 59%. In general, EGF cases tend to make partial use of resources allocated. Although some trends have been found across Member States, discrepancies are largely case-specific. The main reasons for a lower absorption rate are a better-than-expected labour market situation and eligible beneficiaries finding new jobs by themselves when there are delays in the start of EGF measures. Other reasons for lower absorption rates are Member States tending to overestimate budgets to reduce the risk of overspending, and the many unknowns at the time of application (e.g. the needs and interests of workers/NEETs, level of participation in EGF measures). Thus, the absorption rate of an EGF case is not necessarily an indicator for success.
The efficiency of the EGF is hindered by the long decision-making process at EU level, in spite of the substantial shortening of the timing and stricter deadlines for Commission and Member States compared to the previous programming period. Having such a lengthy process not only causes delays in implementation that hinder the effectiveness of EGF cases, but also acts as a barrier for certain Member States wanting to apply for EGF support. The decision-making process at EU level causes delays to project implementation, but procedures at national/regional level are a more significant hindering factor to efficiency.
80% of the EGF cases were more cost-efficient (costs compared to the number of beneficiaries helped) than expected, with the actual amount spent per beneficiary assisted lower than planned. In the long term, the EGF’s cost-effectiveness (costs compared to the number of beneficiaries re-integrated) improved in 68% of cases compared to the short-term results.
On coherence, strong complementarities were found between the EGF and the European Social Fund (ESF), as they have different scopes and objectives, and complementarity is ensured through coordination between the Funds at national level. There is scope to better align the EGF and the ESF, as some Member States choose to fund EGF-type measures using the ESF because of the higher co-financing rate. This is particularly the case for support to young people, as both the EGF and the Youth Employment Initiative support NEETs in regions with high levels of youth unemployment, thus indicating that coherence could be improved. At case level, no overlaps with other EU or national funding could be identified.
The EGF is coherent with national, regional and/or local policies and offers sufficient flexibility to complement and/or add to the labour market measures provided by Member States at national level. The Member States’ use of the EGF could be better coordinated with the recommendations set out in the EU Quality Framework for anticipation of change and restructuring (QFR).
There was a high degree of relevance of EGF funding during the 2014–2020 period. Evidence also showed that the scope was relevant. At the same time, it would benefit from expansion to other major labour market challenges (like automation, digitisation and the transition to a low-carbon economy), in line with the EU’s strategic and long-term priorities.
The intervention criteria of the EGF were found to be relevant and useful. Several Member States indicated that smaller labour markets would benefit from lowering the minimum threshold for redundancies.
Supporting NEETs through the EGF was appreciated but used to a limited degree. Particularly those stakeholders with experience in the delivery of EGF measures questioned whether the EGF was the right channel to deliver assistance to NEETs. Although supporting NEETs through the EGF was appreciated in the 11 out of 49 cases that made use of it, the view prevails that other instruments, like the YEI, might be better placed for this type of support.
The EGF has been successful and generated considerable EU added value during 2014–2020. This is particularly true in terms of its volume, scope, role and process effects, though they differ per Member State and are largely dependent on national support structures. The added value is significant for volume effects, meaning that EGF assistance not only increases the number and variety of services offered, but also their level of intensity, striving to leave no one behind.
As the EGF is largely complementary to other EU instruments (notably the ESF), it adds value compared to their scopes and target groups. It achieves this by offering an additional source of financial support on a case-by-case basis and more targeted, tailored, and individualised support to the very specific and narrow target groups it seeks to assist.
Lessons-learned
On effectiveness, there are several key lessons learned from the implementation both at Member State and at EU level, which would improve the EGF.
At Member State level:
oFaster application process for Member States with previous experience in EGF cases. Those that have applied before for the EGF are more familiar with the application process and will prepare applications that are more complete in the future, leading to efficiency gains. This holds true even for Member States with little experience applying for EGF support. The use of EGF assistance also fosters development of a general delivery mechanism of restructuring assistance in Member States with little experience in dealing with mass redundancies.
oEarly start of national procedures to ensure early intervention. This includes, for instance, procurement of training courses as quickly as possible.
oDesign of the labour market measures. Many Member States acknowledged the importance of tailored support based on beneficiaries’ needs.
oImportance of physical proximity and easily accessible support to beneficiaries. In many cases, the EGF support has positively influenced the way active labour market measures are managed at national level and the partnerships that feed into them.
At EU level, the key lessons learned were:
oThe EGF would benefit from an extended scope adapted to all major challenges facing the European labour market (like automation, digitisation, transition to low-carbon economy).
oAs an emergency response instrument, the mobilisation of the Fund should be sped up by simplifying and shortening the application process, with less evidence required. This simplified process was included the 2021–2027 EGF Regulation and should improve the effectiveness of the EGF.
oThe success of EGF measures should be measured not only through re-integration rates, but also through more qualitative data like new skills and qualifications, social networks and self-confidence gained as a result of participation in EGF measures.
oThe effectiveness of the Fund should be evaluated more systematically at case level, especially regarding the category of workers benefiting from the measures (professional and educational background), their employment status and the type of employment found. If Member States were to develop case-specific targets, the measuring and monitoring of the EGF’s effectiveness would improve. However, some delivery partners were of the opinion that the monitoring and reporting requirements were already too burdensome.
oSome budgetary flexibility is needed for Member States to reallocate the EGF funds based on needs that emerge during implementation, granted that those changes are duly justified. This reallocation of funds was already possible during the 2014–2020 period, and used often for smaller amounts, although some countries seem to have been unaware of this.
oIt is important to maintain the flexibility of the EGF and the degree to which the EGF measures can be tailored to individual beneficiaries’ needs, backgrounds and interests. The flexibility to complement and/or add to the measures provided by Member States at national, regional and/or local level will ensure that the EGF continues to provide EU added value.
In general, the EGF could be better coordinated with the recommendations set out in the EU Quality Framework for anticipation of change and restructuring. While Structural Funds and EGF interventions are consistent with the principles set out in the quality framework, this policy instrument is not referenced in guidance to Member States when designing or implementing measures. In the 2021–2027 EGF Regulation, a requirement was introduced for Member States to indicate how the recommendations set out in the EU QFR were taken into account.
Another lesson learned for both Member States and at EU level is the need to improve communication activities. This can be achieved by explaining what measures and activities can be supported by the EGF and how, through communication adapted to different stakeholders (beneficiaries, companies and training providers) in addition to national EGF operators. The Member States should actively communicate and spread awareness about the EGF, especially among beneficiaries, as this is not done to the same degree in all countries. At EU level, the biannual networking seminars organised by the Commission could be improved with a more bottom-up approach, allowing for more experience sharing. As regards external communication, in the future more emphasis should be put on increasing the visibility of good practices, not only among Member States, but also for the wider public.
As underlined in the mid-term evaluation of the 2014–2020 EGF, another lesson re‑confirmed by this evaluation was on organisational learning and the timing of the evaluation. Case implementation should be finalised, as this ensures ample evidence can be collected, analysed and that the final results achieved are evaluated. The 2021–2027 EGF Regulation addressed the issue of the evaluation’s timing, in order to allow sufficient time for implementation of the EGF cases to be finalised.
The 2021–2027 EGF Regulation addressed many issues (e.g. the extended scope, simpler and faster application procedures, more data collection including a beneficiary survey, the co-financing rate, more communication requirements), based on lessons learned from the implementation of the EGF.
Annex 1: Procedural information
1.Lead DG, Decide Planning/CWP references
This evaluation was carried out by the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) and included in the Commission’s Agenda Planning System (PLAN/2019/5352). DG EMPL drafted the evaluation roadmap, the stakeholder consultation strategy and the terms of reference (for the contract with external experts), and presented them to the Interservice Steering Group (ISSG) for feedback discussions and approval. DG EMPL also served as the main contact point for the external contractor and ensured the publication of all relevant evaluation documents. In the final phase of the evaluation, it is the responsibility of DG EMPL to:
·draft this staff working document;
·draft the report disseminating the evaluation findings to stakeholders;
·conduct follow-up activities, making sure the findings of the evaluation are taken into consideration for future policy design.
2.Organisation and timing
An ISSG was created in May 2019. The invitation launched on 29 April 2019 was addressed to the following DGs: BUDG, COMP, GROW, TRADE, REGIO, ECFIN, the Secretariat-General and the Legal Service.
The timing of the evaluation was as follows:
27 May 2019 –
24 June 2019
|
Publication of the roadmap and feedback period
|
18 July 2019 –
27 August 2019
|
Two rounds of consultation of ISSG via one meeting and one written procedure
|
27 September 2019
|
Request for services for the external study supporting the evaluation
|
19 December 2019
|
Signature of the contract for the supporting study with the consortium led by Ramboll Consulting Management
|
9 January 2020
|
1st meeting of the ISSG: kick-off meeting for the supporting study
|
17 February 2020
|
2nd meeting of the ISSG: draft inception report of the supporting study
|
17 March 2020
|
Stakeholder consultation event: EGF Networking Seminar, discussion of planned further consultations
|
25 June 2020
|
3rd meeting of the ISSG: draft interim report of the supporting study
|
10 June 2020 –
16 September 2020
|
Public consultation
|
13 November 2020
|
4th meeting of the ISSG: draft final report of the supporting study
|
14 January 2021
|
Revised final report of the study
|
July 2021
|
Written consultation on the draft staff working document
|
3.Exceptions to the better regulation guidelines
N/A
4.Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (if applicable)
N/A
5.Evidence, sources and quality
The main instruments used were:
•An EU-wide public consultation, which was carried out and analysed with the assistance of the external team of experts.
•A supporting study carried out by an external team of experts, through contract VC/2019/0815, through DG EMPL Multiple Framework Contract VT/2016-027 for the provision of services related to the implementation of the Better Regulation Guidelines. The supporting study included background reseach and other methods and tools such as desk research, public consultations, case studies, interviews with stakeholders and focus groups (see Annex 2 for more details).
The Interservice Steering Group assessed the quality of the final report of the external contractors to be of very good quality.
The conclusions and findings of the evaluation are considered as robust, within the limitations and the mitigating measures described in Section 4 and Annex 3 to this staff working document.
Annex 2: Stakeholder consultation
According to the Better Regulation Guidelines, part or all of the consultation work can be conducted by an external contractor. After approval by the Commission’s Interservice Steering Group (ISSG), DG EMPL tasked the contractor with conducting the consultations in close cooperation with the Commission departments, to produce reports on each consultation activity and a synopsis report covering all consultation activities. All questionnaires used during the consultations were discussed and approved by the ISSG beforehand. Like all other deliverables, the reports were also subject to scrutiny and approval by the ISSG. The Commission did not conduct any further consultations. The report provided by the external contractor therefore presents a complete picture of the consultation activities. The evaluation study provided by the contractor also draws on the consultation activities. However, when drafting this staff working document, the Commission used the contractor’s report and the results of other specific consultations to double check the validity of data. All reports on the specific consultations are annexed to the contractor’s report. They contain the results of the activities, including all responses to the online questionnaires, etc.
SYNOPSIS REPORT
1.Overview of consultation strategy
To ensure that the general public interest of the Union – as opposed to special interests of stakeholder groups – is well reflected in this evaluation, and in the future design and implementation of the EGF, the Commission regards it as a duty to conduct stakeholder consultations and consult the various stakeholders as widely as possible.
The aim of these stakeholder consultations related to the EGF ex post evaluation was to deliver a high quality and credible assessment by allowing interested parties to provide feedback and suggestions on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, impact and EU added value of the EGF supported actions. This also ensured transparency and accountability.
2.Roadmap
The evaluation roadmap was published on the Commission’s Have your Say portal and made available for public feedback between 27 May 2019 and 24 June 2019. Five contributions (two from Italy and one each from Belgium, Germany and Denmark) were received and the findings were taken into account in the conclusions of this evaluation.
3.Stakeholder categories
The EGF stakeholders at all levels were consulted through a variety of means, ranging from a public consultation to online surveys and targeted interviews. Table 3 below presents an overview of the stakeholders reached through each consultation tool/method.
1)Workers’ organisations/redundant workers: Workers’ organisations and workers themselves can be directly affected. The EGF’s beneficiaries are redundant workers (the most important stakeholders on an individual basis) and the organisations representing them. Depending on the Member State, some of these organisations might also be involved in implementing EGF measures. The interest of the individual redundant worker is very high, but that person’s influence rather low. The interest of the organisations representing the workers is also very high, but their level of influence depends among other things on the Member State in which they operate and the level of involvement assigned to them in the implementation of EGF measures.
2)NEETs: Under Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013, young people who were ‘not in education, employment, or training’ are eligible for EGF support under certain circumstances. The interest of NEETs is therefore very high, but their influence as individuals is rather low.
3)Citizens/general public: The general public constitutes the largest stakeholder group. On the one hand, the general public has an interest in how public funds are spent. On the other, even if the general public is not directly affected by EGF measures, they are indirectly affected by any active labour market policy measure. Due to the more indirect relationship and the fact that the EGF is one of many active labour market policy instruments, this group’s interest is often low. The same can be said for its influence, which is also quite low.
4)Industry/business: Even though the EGF does not provide any support to industry or businesses, they would have a general interest because of the EGF's nature as an active labour market policy instrument. However, there might be very high interest among some organisations representing local business in an area affected by mass redundancies that fall under the EGF provisions, and among organisations representing the interest of an industry strongly affected by globalisation or by the previous global financial and economic crisis. Their influence on the EGF measures is, however, usually low.
5)NGOs: NGOs that are not workers’ organisations and do not represent industries or businesses might still have an interest in the EGF. This group can include special interest organisations with a focus on environmental or gender issues. Their interest would generally be rather low, except regarding the particular causes they represent. Their general influence on the EGF is also rather low.
6)Private-sector bodies and professionals: Private-sector bodies are in most cases involved in implementing EGF measures and so both their interest and influence are high. They may be training bodies, universities, consultancies, advisers and various experts such as medical professionals, psychologists, lawyers, engineers, business and financial advisers, etc.
7)Public authorities: Politicians and national governments have, by definition, a major influence on EGF measures. Each EGF case needs to be approved by the national managing authority, usually a senior civil servant or even a minister, before being submitted to the Commission. The Commission proposal is then presented to the European Parliament and the Council. Due to the limited scope of the EGF, the overall interest of Member State public authorities is not considerable. The national EGF managing authorities, i.e. the contact persons of the EGF, have by definition a very high interest. They also have a high influence, as they are responsible for designing EGF measures in their respective Member States, and are in permanent contact with the Commission. Local authorities in areas affected by EGF cases have a rather high interest in the EGF. Even though they are often involved in implementing EGF measures, they usually do not have a major influence on their design. Their level of influence also varies depending on the Member State.
8)Research: Researchers representing academia or think tanks could have an interest in the EGF and, if they do, their findings might have an influence. These would usually be individual researchers, however, so that it would not make sense to consult ‘researchers’ as a group.
Table 3. Stakeholder consultation strategy: overview
Stakeholders
|
Surveys
|
EU-level targeted interviews
|
National-/case-level targeted interviews and focus groups
|
Public consultation
|
EU-level stakeholders
|
|
X
|
|
|
EGF contact persons in Member States
|
X
|
|
X
|
X
|
EGF beneficiaries
|
X
|
|
X
|
X
|
Public authorities: local/regional level
|
|
|
X
|
X
|
Industry/businesses
|
|
|
X
|
X
|
Workers’ organisations
|
|
|
X
|
X
|
Private-sector bodies and professionals
|
|
|
X
|
X
|
NGOs
|
|
|
|
X
|
Citizens/general public
|
|
|
|
X
|
Research
|
|
|
X
|
X
|
4.Consultation methods and tools
4.1.Public consultation
The aim of the public consultation was to ensure transparency in the evaluation process by involving the general public in a way that is complementary to the targeted consultation activities.
The public consultation was open for feedback between 10 June 2020 and 16 September 2020. The following dissemination strategies were used to advertise the launch of the public consultation on the EU Survey Portal: publication on DG EMPL’s website, dissemination and reminders through social media accounts and snowballing with the support of EGF contact persons.
The public consultation received 39 responses. Responses came from 17 different countries, of which 15 in Europe. There was an unbalanced geographical distribution, with 7 countries (Malta, Romania, Spain, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Belgium) responsible for around 66% of responses received (see Figure 12 below). Most respondents identified themselves either as representatives of a public authority or as (EU) citizens.
Figure 12. Breakdown of the 39 responses received by Member State
Source: Summary report of the public consultation on the ex post evaluation of the EGF
Most members of the public participating in the public consultation were female, employed and in the 35-44 age group. Younger age groups were considerably less represented. The majority of the respondents also indicated that they belonged to a large or medium-sized company at the national or local level.
4.2.Targeted online surveys with EGF beneficiaries and Member States that did not apply for co-financing
Two online surveys were run: one to gain insight into the experiences and impact of the EGF support provided to beneficiaries, and one to understand why certain countries did not apply for co-financing. The first online survey was aimed at EGF beneficiaries (end users), and the second at EGF contact persons in countries that did not apply for EGF funding in the 2014–2020 period.
Key results of the EGF beneficiary survey
The survey specifically aimed to gain a perspective on the experience and impact of the support from those it intends to help (EGF beneficiaries), and to gather views on how the EGF compares to other forms of support for redundant workers (and NEETs).
Some 1 306 completed responses to the survey were received, along with 351 partially completed results (i.e. people who started filling it out but did not get through the whole survey). Based on methodological considerations, 922 responses were considered in our analysis. The responses received are geographically imbalanced, with half of the responses received from Finland, followed by Spain and Germany. No eligible answers were received from Estonia or Sweden despite support from EGF contact persons and reminders sent. This introduced a certain degree of bias, meaning that the results are not necessarily representative of the experience of all beneficiaries across all EGF cases and countries.
The majority of beneficiaries indicated that they had lost their job in 2016 and were in the 45–54 age group when they received help in (re-)entering the job market. Only a small number of respondents were between 15 and 24, hinting at a low representation of NEETs among EGF beneficiaries. The gender distribution was quite imbalanced in favour of male respondents, who made up more than half of the respondents.
Respondents who indicated that they were aware of having benefited from EGF measures were asked to indicate when this support started. The average length of EGF support is around 8 months. The majority benefited from the EGF for 6-12 months, followed by those who benefited for longer than 12 months. A smaller group benefited for 3-6 months or less than 3 months.
4.3.Member State-level interviews and focus groups
The fieldwork involved: (i) semi-structured interviews or focus groups in all Member States with cases; and (ii) case studies in 12 Member States, covering 31 EGF cases. About four interviews were carried out per case, and there were two overarching country-specific interviews.
These interviews targeted EGF managing authorities, case coordinators, delivery partners, social partners and former employers. The interviews and case studies were used as the main source of information to answer the evaluation questions and feed into case study reports.
4.4.EU-level interviews
The purpose of the EU-level interviews was to add more in-depth qualitative evidence to data already gathered on the design and implementation of the EGF, and fill data gaps emerging from other consultation tools.
Eight semi-structured EU interviews were conducted with European Commission staff (three), (former) Members of the European Parliament (two), a social partner, and Member States (two) that did not apply for EGF support during the 2014–2020 period.
5.Results of consultation activities
5.1.Effectiveness
The EGF had been effective and had achieved its key objectives. The objective of the EGF is clear, and almost all respondents believe it is appropriate. Nevertheless, there was room for improvement in the way the Fund was designed, managed and implemented. Respondents also indicated that there are both barriers and encouraging factors that determine the extent to which Member States apply for EGF support. Overall, Member States still did not use the EGF to its full potential, with several reasons for this identified. Those reasons included: (i) countries might not satisfy the EGF intervention criteria, (the minimum threshold of 500 dismissed workers was too high); (ii) the co-financing rate of EGF is for many countries lower than that available under the ESF; and (iii) there is still lack of awareness of the EGF and the funding possibilities it offers.
Interviewees agreed that the EGF had proven to be a useful tool in supporting dismissed workers. Most respondents also indicated that the EGF was more effective than national policies in supporting redundant workers. Additionally, EGF measures increasingly took into account the socio-economic context in which dismissed workers lived, therefore addressing their needs in a holistic way.
Furthermore, it appeared that the EGF results in high re-employment rates. On average, around 60% of dismissed workers were said to be re-employed after receiving EGF support, which indeed is reflected in the data. According to one interviewee, these rates appear higher than those achieved by the ESF. EGF measures also usually result in the creation of a social network around the dismissed workers, which is an unintended yet positive effect of the Fund.
Ultimately, Member States are responsible for ensuring that the short-term emergency relief provided by the EGF turns into sustainable, long-term effects. However, progress on case-specific objectives was said to be poorly monitored by Member States. This was because there was no structured process to follow up on EGF effects. Member States were only obliged to report on the number of people initially targeted and those who received EGF support.
Furthermore, because of the time lag between the application and the implementation period, the EGF might have failed to target all people who would in principle need support. At the same time, the time lag between implementation and application also ensured that only the people that would not find re-employment or training without the EGF were targeted by it.
Finally, the decision-making process at the EU level to finance/implement a case was considered lengthy. At the same time, it was also highlighted that the quality of applications received affected the length of the decision-making process – a well-written application fully meeting all the criteria would be processed faster than a poorly written one. It appeared that Member States had developed and improved their understanding of EGF over time, resulting in better applications and better implementation of cases.
5.2.Efficiency
The Fund has been efficient in the use of resources. In fact, most respondents believed that the same results could not have been achieved with fewer resources. The majority of stakeholders also indicated that the same results could probably not have been achieved in a shorter period of time. Member States often overestimate costs, and hence returned unused funds. This suggests that the EGF funding was adequate to cover the expenses incurred by Member States.
The decision-making process is considered to be lengthy and would benefit from simplification. Linking the need for EGF funds to the impacts of globalisation had proven particularly challenging for applicant Member States. This resulted in some applications going through several iterations, which would need to be revised on multiple occasions by the different stakeholders involved. In turn, this resulted in efficiency losses in terms of time spent and staff involved in the application process.
However, a few stakeholders believed that the application process and requirements were not excessively complicated, although it involved a learning process on the part of the applicant authorities. Once the learning process was complete, subsequent applications would require fewer resources, both in terms of staff and financial resources. In fact, it appears that the Fund’s efficiency and how it is managed at EU level greatly improved over time.
5.3.Relevance
Among the 15 respondents who were aware of the EGF, the results concerning relevance were mixed. Most respondents indicated that the scope of the EGF is no longer entirely appropriate and useful, and that it should be made more flexible and broadened to consider emerging needs.
There is no unanimity as to whether the EGF intervention criteria are still relevant and useful – respondents were almost equally split on this aspect. Those who do not regard the criteria as still relevant specified that the threshold of 500 redundancies is no longer realistic, and that lowering it to 250 would result in increased use of the Fund.
However, not all stakeholders agreed that NEETs should be targeted by the EGF. Two main reasons were provided to justify this statement:
·The EGF was not seen as the most appropriate fund for NEETs. Other instruments – primarily the YEI – are more specialised to provide tailored support.
·NEETs as a target group are very different from workers made redundant. Therefore, the connection between support to dismissed workers and NEETs is somewhat ‘artificial’ and not justified.
Most stakeholders believed that the EGF intervention criteria would benefit from revision: further lowering the threshold of dismissed workers and lowering the dismissal period within which workers are eligible for EGF support would make the EGF more accessible to smaller countries. This in turn would make it more flexible to adapt to diverse needs. The other stakeholders believed the EGF was sufficiently flexible as it was mobilised based on needs.
5.4.Coherence
Most interviewees identified strong complementarity between the EGF and the European Social Fund, and also between the EGF and other support measures available at national level. The EGF and ESF allowed for the implementation of largely comparable measures. The EGF is a tailored, specific fund to target the needs of a very narrow group. This is not the case for the ESF, which is broader in its objectives and the people it targets.
Views on the EGF’s coherence with other EU policies were limited and could not be generalised.
5.5.EU added value
All interviewed stakeholders at EU level thought the EGF had added value compared to what could have been achieved by the Member States themselves. Three key findings on the EGF’s added value emerged:
·The EGF was seen as a complementary resource to national measures. In the absence of the EGF, some Member States would have had very limited/no resources to address the needs of dismissed workers.
·The EGF provided rapid relief for emergency circumstances.
·The EGF demonstrated EU solidarity towards dismissed workers.
The EGF has also favoured a learning process and provided lessons that have been applied in other circumstances or improved implementation processes at national level.
Annex 3: Methods and analytical models
In 2019, in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines, the Commission published the roadmap for this evaluation and organised a four-week online consultation. At the end of 2019, the Commission contracted out the supporting study for the evaluation. The evaluation questions included in this study derived from the Better Regulation evaluation criteria were broken down into a number of sub-questions and agreed with the Interservice Steering Group. The Commission’s stakeholder consultation strategy for this evaluation was also agreed with the ISSG and run by the external experts.
In line with the EGF Regulation, this evaluation is largely based on the supporting study carried out by external experts. The approach it took was as follows:
·collect and analyse the relevant evidence;
·provide answers to all evaluation questions;
·present evidence-based conclusions.
The evaluation was based on the overarching evaluation questions for each criterion; each overarching question was further detailed in sub-questions, as presented in Table 4 below. The evaluation work and the supporting study were structured around the conclusions reached on each of the questions.
The Commission based this evaluation mainly on the results of the supporting study and complemented it, where appropriate, with additional evidence from previous reports, evaluations and general experience in the management of the EGF.
Methodology and data sources
The supporting study is based on a complex methodology aimed at collecting robust evidence and providing well-informed answers to the evaluation questions. The main methods and data sources were mentioned in Chapter 4 of this staff working document. These methods and data sources are described in more detail below.
OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE METHODOLOGY AND DATA
The various sources mentioned above were triangulated and, where the evidence was insufficient or inconclusive, the sources were combined: these were data-based, documentary and perception-based sources, as well as quantitative and qualitative techniques, depending on the nature of the evaluation question and the strengths of the relevant data and approaches.
The main weaknesses and challenges mentioned in Chapter 4 of this staff working document are:
·Timing of the ex post evaluation. The figures in the supporting study are based on the situation at the end of November 2020, when it was sent to the Commission. The 2020 applications could not be evaluated and included in the study because their results will only be available in 2023 (24 months for implementation). For earlier cases, there may be small differences in figures as the data were extracted from the electronic data exchange platform (SFC2014) at different times, while data may be corrected during the examination and acceptance of the final report.
·Limited suitable comparators for data from 2007–2013 remained an issue. A comparison with data from the 2007–2013 period is of limited use because of several changes in the EGF’s design (see Table 6 below) and the evolving economic context. This evaluation partially overcome this issue by using a new method of comparison through a counterfactual impact evaluation for two EGF cases from 2014–2020.
·The relatively small number of EGF applications received during the period covered by the evaluation (49 cases from 27 economic sectors) made it impossible to conduct sectoral analyses. To overcome this, based on the internal Commission EGF Database, overview tables on case profile data sorted by country and by sector were created; these can be found in Annex 4.
·The basic reporting requirements requested by the EGF Regulation. In their final report, Member States have to state the type of action and main outcomes, the characteristics of the targeted beneficiaries and their employment status. Data on beneficiaries are broken down by gender and by age groups. There are no common indicators to measure outputs and results. Similarly, no targets are set at the time of the application. Therefore performance cannot be assessed against planned outcomes. Overall, the available data are limited and do not allow for further statistical analyses of the categories of beneficiaries, or a further breakdown of beneficiaries based on type of dismissing enterprise. This issue was already identified by the European Court of Auditors during the audit of the 2007–2013 EGF, in the course of the mid-term and ex post evaluations of the 2007–2013 EGF and in the mid-term evaluation of the 2014–2020 EGF.
·The significant differences across cases, Member States and economic sectors made it difficult to formulate reliable conclusions on the EGF’s cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
·Reaching EGF beneficiaries was difficult, despite all efforts by the external evaluators, the Commission and the national EGF contact persons. Beneficiaries could not be reached in all Member States; reasons for this included General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) constraints, or because a long time had elapsed since beneficiaries participated in EGF measures.
·Difficulty identifying whether survey respondents actually participated in EGF measures. It is possible that persons who responded to the survey did not actually receive EGF support, or that they did but were not aware that the support provided was co-financed by the EGF.
·Public consultation alone cannot be considered as representative, so some mitigation measures have been applied, notably triangulation with other data sources.
·Counterfactual impact evaluation: this was a new method used for two EGF cases, one from the Netherlands and one from Ireland. Although the results were inconclusive because of data limitations, they provided relevant information about the effect of a single EGF intervention but not about the EGF as such.
·The COVID-19 pandemic caused considerable delays in data collection as travel was banned and the case studies had to be carried out via other electronic means. It also had an impact on the implementation of measures in one EGF case and very likely also on its longer-term results.
To overcome these limitations the study has collected data from a variation of data sources such as surveys, in-depth interviews and a public consultation. These data sources provided opinions and perceptions of different stakeholders, which in some instances may be the only available source of evidence.
Under the Better Regulation Guidelines, the public consultation is an important tool for collecting stakeholder input and views on EU policy initiatives. It cannot provide a fully representative view of EU public opinion, but it does offer a channel for those who care about a given issue to voice their opinion. A clear distinction was made between respondents who were well-informed about the EGF and others. Although a limited number of responses were received, the analysis of the responses was fed into the findings of the evaluation and triangulated with other sources of evidence.
The reliability and validity of the results presented in this study were ensured by triangulation, using various methods combining qualitative and quantitative data collection and analytical methods.
In conclusion, while acknowledging that there are some data gaps and methodical limitations, the evaluation presents well-informed, evidence-based and reliable answers to the evaluation questions (see Table 4 below).
Table 4. Evaluation questions and sub-questions
Questions and sub-questions
|
Section in staff working document
|
Data and info sources
|
Effectiveness (EQ1): The aim of the EGF is to demonstrate solidarity towards workers made redundant and to ensure for each EGF case that the largest possible number of beneficiaries find sustainable employment as soon as possible.
As an instrument, how effective was the EGF in achieving these aims?
At the level of cases, how effective was the EGF in achieving these aims?
|
1.1: To what extent is the support provided by the EGF used by Member States?
|
5.1.c
|
·Literature and data review
·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding
·Targeted interviews
·Public consultation
|
1.2: To what extent is the support provided by the EGF used by beneficiaries?
|
5.1.c
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
·Public consultation
|
1.3: To what extent was the co-financing rate appropriate?
|
5.1.c
|
·Literature and data review
·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding
·Targeted interviews
|
1.4: To what extent have Member States offered EGF support to all eligible beneficiaries?
|
5.1.b
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
·Online survey of beneficiaries – profiling questions
|
1.5: At case level, did the support offered and the way it is being offered correspond to the needs of the beneficiaries and their specific profiles?
|
5.1.b
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding
·Online survey of beneficiaries
·Public consultation
|
1.6: What were the factors that helped or hindered the achievement of EGF cases’ objectives?
|
5.1.e
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
|
1.7: At the level of cases, to what extent have the challenges identified been tackled?
|
5.1.e
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
|
1.8: To what extent were case-specific objectives/aims established?
|
5.1.d
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
|
1.9: To what extent were case-specific objectives monitored?
|
5.1.d
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
|
1.10: Were the national monitoring systems timely and effective?
|
5.1.d
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
|
1.11: How reliable was the data collected and was it sufficient?
|
5.1.d
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
·Counterfactual impact evaluation
|
1.12: To what extent have Member States made use of the possibility of the EGF support to NEETs?
|
5.1.c
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
|
1.13: At instrument level, did EU or national procedures in place ensure a swift and resource saving decision-making process and thus a quick implementation?
|
5.1.e
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding
|
1.14: How effective was the EGF support for beneficiaries?
|
5.1.a
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
·Online survey of beneficiaries
·Public consultation
|
1.15: How and to what extent has the EGF support had a short-term and medium-term impact on individual participants?
|
5.1.a
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
·Online survey of beneficiaries
|
1.16: Were there any unexpected or unintended effects linked to the implementation of EGF measures?
|
5.1.a
|
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
·Online survey of beneficiaries
|
1.17: How do the impacts observed compare with those achieved by:
(a) individuals who did not receive EGF support (the control group when available);
(b) similar re-employment projects at national or regional level?
|
5.1.a
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
·Online survey of beneficiaries
·Counterfactual impact evaluation
|
1.18: To the extent of available evidence, what are the long-term effects generated by the EGF cases?
|
5.1.a
|
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
·Online survey of beneficiaries
·Public consultation
|
1.19: What lessons have been drawn or could be drawn from EGF implementation, both by the Commission as well as by national, regional and local authorities?
|
5.1.h
|
·Targeted interviews
·Public consultation
|
1.20. To what extent have social partners contributed to the design and provision of coherent support packages?
|
5.1.f
|
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
|
1.21. To what extent have companies contributed to the design and provision of coherent support packages?
|
5.1.f
|
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
|
1.22. To what extent have Member States incentivised local companies to employ dismissed workers?
|
n/a
|
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
|
1.23: What was the overall impact of EGF? (based on results of previous questions)
·Instrument level
·Case level
|
5.1.i
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
·Online survey of beneficiaries
·Public consultation
|
1.24: To what extent have the information and communication activities of
·the Commission
·Member States
proven useful and reached the dismissed workers and EU citizens?
|
5.1.g
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
·Online survey of beneficiaries
|
Efficiency (EQ2): To what extent were the results of the EGF per beneficiary cost-efficient? Are there significant differences in EGF cost-efficiency between and within Member States and per economic sector defined at NACE Revision 2 division level? If so, what is causing them? And how do these differences relate to the EGF support as a whole?
|
2.1: To what extent were the results of the EGF per beneficiary cost-efficient?
|
5.2.a
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
·Public consultation
|
2.2: At case level, to what extent could the same results have been achieved with fewer resources and/or in a shorter period of time?
|
5.2.a
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
|
2.3: At case level, to what extent are the costs incurred justified, given the benefits which have been achieved?
|
5.2.a
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
|
2.4: What is the overall and case-by-case absorption rate of the funding support from the EGF to Member States?
|
5.2.a
|
·Literature and data review
|
2.5: At instrument level, to what extent were the procedures related to the application and allocation of EGF funding efficient?
|
5.2.b
|
·Literature and data review
·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding
·Targeted interviews
|
Coherence (EQ3): How coherent is the EGF intervention with other European Union programmes and national instruments?
|
3.1: How coherent is the EGF intervention with other European Union programmes?
|
5.3.a
|
·Literature and data review
|
3.2: How coherent is the EGF intervention with other national instruments?
|
5.3.b
|
·Literature and data review
|
3.3: At instrument and case level, to what extent have Member States ensured the complementarity of EGF support with other European Union instruments, such as the European Social Fund, the Youth Employment Initiative, or national instruments in Member States?
|
5.3.a
|
·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding
·Targeted interviews
·Public consultation
|
3.4: If applicable, are there any lessons learned for ensuring complementarity?
|
5.3.b
|
·Targeted interviews
|
3.5: At case level, to what extent have there been overlaps between EGF support and other interventions in the Member States?
|
5.3.a
|
·Literature and data review
·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding
·Targeted interviews
·Public consultation
|
3.6: At case level, to what extent have there been synergies between EGF support and other interventions in the Member States?
|
5.3.a
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
·Public consultation
|
Relevance (EQ4): How relevant is the EGF?
|
4.1: To what extent was the scope of the EGF as defined in Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013 appropriate and useful for its aims?
|
5.4.a
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
·Public consultation
·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding
|
4.2: To what extent were the intervention criteria of the EGF as defined in Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013 appropriate and useful for its aims?
|
5.4.b
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
·Public consultation
·Online survey of EGF contact persons in Member States which did not apply for EGF funding
|
4.3: To what extent did the EGF support to NEETs reflect the needs of Member States?
|
5.4.c
|
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
·Public consultation
|
EU added value (EQ5): What is the EU added value of the EGF intervention?
|
5.1: At case level, what is the EU added value of the EGF intervention?
|
5.5
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
·Online survey of beneficiaries
·Public consultation
|
5.2: At instrument level, what is the EU added value of the EGF intervention?
|
5.5
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
·Online survey of beneficiaries
·Public consultation
|
5.3: To what extent does the aid offered by the EGF replace or complement measures or allowances which the Member State would provide in the absence of EGF funding?
|
5.5
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews
·Public consultation
|
5.4: Were there any cross-region and/or cross-border effects of the EGF cases implemented?
|
5.5
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
·Online survey of beneficiaries
|
5.5: At case level, what has been the EU added value of EGF measures targeted at NEETs?
|
5.5
|
·Literature and data review
·Targeted interviews / online focus groups
·Online survey of beneficiaries
·Counterfactual impact evaluation
|
Annex 4: Case profile data by Member State and by sector
Under Article 20(3) of the EGF Regulation, evaluations must include the figures showing the number of applications and cover the performance of the EGF by country and by sector, to assess whether the EGF is reaching its targeted recipients. The tables in this annex provide an overview of the 2014–2020 EGF cases. There are 54 cases in total, of which the results are available for 46 cases. Due to the small number of cases, profound analyses per Member State or per industrial sector were not possible.
The most important general data on cases covered by this evaluation are given below.
For completeness of the exercise and for information purposes, we present overview tables on cases, sorted by Member State and subsequently per sector. The final table in this annex presents workers targeted in EGF cases, including the breakdown by gender and age of targeted workers.
The figure below offers a comparison between the number of NEETs targeted by the respective cases offering support to NEETs, and the actual number of NEETs supported.
Figure 13. NEETs targeted compared to NEETs reached
Source: Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), p.36
Table 5. General overview of the 54 applications received between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2020 (without withdrawn
and rejected
cases)
Case ref.
|
Case name
|
Member State
|
Sector (NACE)
|
Intervention criterion
|
Globalisation / crisis
|
EGF amount requested (€)
|
EGF amount spent (€)
|
Workers targeted
|
Workers helped
|
Average EGF amount spent per worker
|
EGF/2014/001
|
Nutriart
|
EL
|
Bakery products
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 096 000
|
1 536 355
|
508
|
249
|
6 170
|
EGF/2014/002
|
Gelderland and Overijssel
|
NL
|
Construction of buildings
|
b
|
Crisis
|
1 625 781
|
1 167 559
|
475
|
467
|
2 500
|
EGF/2014/003
|
Aragon
|
ES
|
Food and beverage services
|
b
|
Crisis
|
960 000
|
804 140
|
280
|
274
|
2 935
|
EGF/2014/004
|
Comunidad Valenciana metal
|
ES
|
Manufacture of fabricated metal products
|
b
|
Crisis
|
1 019 184
|
321 877
|
300
|
174
|
1 850
|
EGF/2014/005
|
GAD
|
FR
|
Slaughterhouse
|
a
|
Crisis
|
918 000
|
442 749
|
760
|
559
|
792
|
EGF/2014/006
|
PSA
|
FR
|
Automotive
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
12 704 605
|
12 464 172
|
2 357
|
2 357
|
5 288
|
EGF/2014/007
|
Andersen Ireland
|
IE
|
Jewellery
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
1 501 200
|
1 089 699
|
138
|
138
|
7 896
|
EGF/2014/008
|
STX Rauma
|
FI
|
Building of ships and boats
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 426 800
|
1 311 961
|
565
|
589
|
2 227
|
EGF/2014/009
|
Sprider Stores
|
EL
|
Retail trade
|
a
|
Crisis
|
7 290 900
|
2 482 743
|
761
|
517
|
4 802
|
EGF/2014/010
|
Whirlpool
|
IT
|
Domestic appliances
|
a
|
Crisis
|
1 890 000
|
1 572 723
|
608
|
608
|
2 587
|
EGF/2014/011
|
Caterpillar
|
BE
|
Manufacture of machinery and equipment
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 222 854
|
829 415
|
630
|
501
|
1 656
|
EGF/2014/012
|
ArcelorMittal
|
BE
|
Manufacture of basic metals
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 591 486
|
1 443 884
|
910
|
780
|
1 851
|
EGF/2014/013
|
Odyssefs Fokas
|
EL
|
Retail trade
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 444 000
|
2 293 466
|
600
|
379
|
6 051
|
EGF/2014/014
|
Aleo Solar
|
DE
|
Solar modules
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 094 760
|
533 480
|
476
|
408
|
1 308
|
EGF/2014/015
|
Attica Publishing Services
|
EL
|
Publishing
|
b
|
Crisis
|
3 746 700
|
816 310
|
705
|
205
|
3 982
|
EGF/2014/016
|
Lufthansa Technik
|
IE
|
Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
2 490 758
|
1 790 014
|
250
|
253
|
7 075
|
EGF/2014/017
|
Mory-Ducros
|
FR
|
Land transport
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 052 200
|
4 393 239
|
2 513
|
2 513
|
1 748
|
EGF/2014/018
|
Attica Broadcasting
|
EL
|
Broadcasting
|
b
|
Crisis
|
5 046 000
|
1 214 929
|
928
|
349
|
3 481
|
EGF/2015/001
|
Broadcom
|
FI
|
Wholesale trade
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 365 000
|
876 467
|
500
|
374
|
2 343
|
EGF/2015/002
|
Adam Opel
|
DE
|
Automotive
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 958 623
|
3 811 240
|
2 692
|
2 621
|
1 454
|
EGF/2015/003
|
Ford Genk
|
BE
|
Automotive
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
6 268 564
|
4 753 175
|
4 500
|
4 500
|
1 056
|
EGF/2015/004
|
Alitalia
|
IT
|
Air transport
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 414 848
|
23 436
|
184
|
184
|
127
|
EGF/2015/005
|
Computer programming
|
FI
|
Computer programming
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
2 623 200
|
2 008 001
|
1 200
|
1 356
|
1 481
|
EGF/2015/006
|
PWA International
|
IE
|
Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
442 293
|
442 293
|
108
|
86
|
5 143
|
EGF/2015/007
|
Hainaut-Namur Glass
|
BE
|
Manufacture of glass
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
1 095 544
|
814 869
|
412
|
342
|
2 383
|
EGF/2015/009
|
Volvo Trucks
|
SE
|
Automotive
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 793 710
|
1 120 124
|
500
|
450
|
2 489
|
EGF/2015/010
|
MoryGlobal
|
FR
|
Land transport
|
a
|
Crisis
|
5 146 800
|
409 3159
|
2 132
|
2 132
|
1 920
|
EGF/2015/011
|
Supermarket Larissa
|
EL
|
Retail trade
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 468 000
|
2 045 939
|
557
|
497
|
4 117
|
EGF/2015/012
|
Hainaut Machinery
|
BE
|
Manufacture of machinery and equipment
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
1 824 041
|
726 183
|
488
|
355
|
2 046
|
EGF/2016/001
|
Microsoft
|
FI
|
Computer programming
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
5 364 000
|
4 559 861
|
1 441
|
1 629
|
2 799
|
EGF/2016/002
|
Ericsson
|
SE
|
Computers, electronic and optical products
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
3 957 918
|
933 939
|
918
|
224
|
4 169
|
EGF/2016/003
|
petroleum and chemicals
|
EE
|
Chemicals
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
1 131 358
|
821 523
|
800
|
492
|
1 670
|
EGF/2016/004
|
Comunidad Valenciana Automotive
|
ES
|
Automotive
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
856 800
|
173 161
|
250
|
134
|
1 292
|
EGF/2016/005
|
Drenthe Overijssel Retail
|
NL
|
Retail trade
|
b
|
Crisis
|
1 818 750
|
853 871
|
800
|
754
|
1 132
|
EGF/2016/008
|
Nokia Network Systems
|
FI
|
Computers, electronic and optical products
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
2 641 800
|
2 641 800
|
821
|
777
|
3 400
|
EGF/2017/001
|
Castilla y León mining of coal
|
ES
|
Mining of coal and lignite
|
c (Labour market)
|
Globalisation
|
1 002 264
|
631 186
|
339
|
198
|
3 188
|
EGF/2017/002
|
Microsoft
|
FI
|
Computer programming
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
3 520 080
|
2 937 160
|
1 000
|
883
|
3 326
|
EGF/2017/003
|
Attica retail
|
EL
|
Retail trade
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Crisis
|
2 949 150
|
602 708
|
725
|
217
|
2 777
|
EGF/2017/004
|
Almaviva
|
IT
|
Call centre
|
a
|
Crisis
|
3 347 370
|
812 669
|
1 610
|
1 423
|
571
|
EGF/2017/005
|
Retail
|
FI
|
Retail trade
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
2 499 360
|
1 581 287
|
1 500
|
1 467
|
1 078
|
EGF/2017/006
|
Galicia wearing apparel
|
ES
|
Apparel
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
720 000
|
306 818
|
303
|
146
|
2 101
|
EGF/2017/007
|
Ericsson
|
SE
|
Computers, electronic and optical products
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
2 130 400
|
290 092
|
900
|
80
|
3 626
|
EGF/2017/008
|
Goodyear
|
DE
|
Rubber and plastic products
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
2 165 231
|
1 171 002
|
646
|
622
|
1 883
|
EGF/2017/009
|
Air France
|
FR
|
Air transport
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
9 894 483
|
9 846 483
|
1 858
|
1 858
|
5 300
|
EGF/2017/010
|
Caterpillar
|
BE
|
Manufacture of machinery and equipment
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
4 621 616
|
4 068 634
|
2 285
|
1 772
|
2 296
|
EGF/2018/001
|
Financial service activities
|
NL
|
Financial service activities
|
b
|
Crisis
|
1 192 500
|
486 410
|
450
|
179
|
2 717
|
EGF/2018/002
|
Norte Centro Lisboa wearing apparel
|
PT
|
Apparel
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
4 655 883
|
N/A
|
730
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
EGF/2018/003
|
Attica Publishing Activities
|
EL
|
Publishing
|
b
|
Crisis
|
2 308 500
|
N/A
|
550
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
EGF/2020/001
|
Galicia shipbuilding ancillary sectors
|
ES
|
Building of ships and boats
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
2 054 400
|
N/A
|
500
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
EGF/2020/002
|
Estonia Tourism
|
EE
|
Tourism
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Crisis
|
4 474 480
|
N/A
|
5 060
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
EGF/2020/003
|
GMH Guss
|
DE
|
Manufacture of basic metals
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 081 706
|
N/A
|
476
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
EGF/2020/004
|
KLM
|
NL
|
Air transport
|
a
|
Crisis
|
5 019 218
|
N/A
|
1 201
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
EGF/2020/005
|
Swissport
|
BE
|
Warehousing, support activities for transportation, Services to buildings & landscape activities
|
a
|
Crisis
|
3 719 224
|
N/A
|
1 468
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
EGF/2020/007
|
Finnair
|
FI
|
Air transport
|
a
|
Crisis
|
1 752 360
|
N/A
|
500
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Totals 2014-2020
|
173 400 703
|
89 942 205
|
54 168
|
37 072
|
2 426
|
Source: EGF Database
Table 6. EGF applications sorted by Member States (without withdrawn or rejected applications)
Member State
|
Case ref.
|
Case name
|
Sector (NACE)
|
Intervention criterion
|
Globalisation / crisis
|
EGF amount requested (€)
|
EGF amount spent (€)
|
Workers targeted
|
Workers helped
|
Average EGF amount spent per worker
|
BE
|
EGF/2014/011
|
Caterpillar
|
Manufacture of machinery and equipment
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 222 854
|
829 415
|
630
|
501
|
1 656
|
BE
|
EGF/2014/012
|
ArcelorMittal
|
Manufacture of basic metals
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 591 486
|
1 443 884
|
910
|
780
|
1 851
|
BE
|
EGF/2015/003
|
Ford Genk
|
Automotive
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
6 268 564
|
4 753 175
|
4 500
|
4 500
|
1 056
|
BE
|
EGF/2015/007
|
Hainaut-Namur Glass
|
Manufacture of glass
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
1 095 544
|
814 869
|
412
|
342
|
2 383
|
BE
|
EGF/2015/012
|
Hainaut Machinery
|
Manufacture of machinery and equipment
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
1 824 041
|
726 183
|
488
|
355
|
2 046
|
BE
|
EGF/2017/010
|
Caterpillar
|
Manufacture of machinery and equipment
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
4 621 616
|
4 068 634
|
2 285
|
1 772
|
2 296
|
BE
|
EGF/2020/005
|
Swissport
|
Warehousing, support activities for transportation, Services to buildings & landscape activities
|
a
|
Crisis
|
3 719 224
|
N/A
|
1 468
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
DE
|
EGF/2014/014
|
Aleo Solar
|
Solar modules
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 094 760
|
533 480
|
476
|
408
|
1 308
|
DE
|
EGF/2015/002
|
Adam Opel
|
Automotive
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 958 623
|
3 811 240
|
2 692
|
2 621
|
1 454
|
DE
|
EGF/2017/008
|
Goodyear
|
Rubber and plastic products
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
2 165 231
|
1 171 002
|
646
|
622
|
1 883
|
DE
|
EGF/2020/003
|
GMH Guss
|
Manufacture of basic metals
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 081 706
|
N/A
|
476
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
EE
|
EGF/2016/003
|
petroleum and chemicals
|
Chemicals
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
1 131 358
|
821 523
|
800
|
492
|
1 670
|
EE
|
EGF/2020/002
|
Estonia Tourism
|
Tourism
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Crisis
|
4 474 480
|
N/A
|
5 060
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
EL
|
EGF/2014/001
|
Nutriart
|
Bakery products
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 096 000
|
1 536 355
|
508
|
249
|
6 170
|
EL
|
EGF/2014/009
|
Sprider Stores
|
Retail trade
|
a
|
Crisis
|
7 290 900
|
2 482 743
|
761
|
517
|
4 802
|
EL
|
EGF/2014/013
|
Odyssefs Fokas
|
Retail trade
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 444 000
|
2 293 466
|
600
|
379
|
6 051
|
EL
|
EGF/2014/015
|
Attica Publishing Services
|
Publishing
|
b
|
Crisis
|
3 746 700
|
816 310
|
705
|
205
|
3 982
|
EL
|
EGF/2014/018
|
Attica Broadcasting
|
Broadcasting
|
b
|
Crisis
|
5 046 000
|
1 214 929
|
928
|
349
|
3 481
|
EL
|
EGF/2015/011
|
Supermarket Larissa
|
Retail trade
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 468 000
|
2 045 939
|
557
|
497
|
4 117
|
EL
|
EGF/2017/003
|
Attica retail
|
Retail trade
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Crisis
|
2 949 150
|
602 708
|
725
|
217
|
2 777
|
EL
|
EGF/2018/003
|
Attica Publishing Activities
|
Publishing
|
b
|
Crisis
|
2 308 500
|
N/A
|
550
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
ES
|
EGF/2014/003
|
Aragon
|
Food and beverage services
|
b
|
Crisis
|
960 000
|
804 140
|
280
|
274
|
2 935
|
ES
|
EGF/2014/004
|
Comunidad Valenciana metal
|
Manufacture of fabricated metal products
|
b
|
Crisis
|
1 019 184
|
321 877
|
300
|
174
|
1 850
|
ES
|
EGF/2016/004
|
Comunidad Valenciana Automotive
|
Automotive
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
856 800
|
173 161
|
250
|
134
|
1 292
|
ES
|
EGF/2017/001
|
Castilla y León mining of coal
|
Mining of coal and lignite
|
c (Labour market)
|
Globalisation
|
1 002 264
|
631 186
|
339
|
198
|
3 188
|
ES
|
EGF/2017/006
|
Galicia wearing apparel
|
Apparel
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
720 000
|
306 818
|
303
|
146
|
2 101
|
ES
|
EGF/2020/001
|
Galicia shipbuilding ancillary sectors
|
Building of ships and boats
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
2 054 400
|
N/A
|
500
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
FI
|
EGF/2014/008
|
STX Rauma
|
Building of ships and boats
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 426 800
|
1 311 961
|
565
|
589
|
2 227
|
FI
|
EGF/2015/001
|
Broadcom
|
Wholesale trade
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 365 000
|
876 467
|
500
|
374
|
2 343
|
FI
|
EGF/2015/005
|
Computer programming
|
Computer programming
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
2 623 200
|
2 008 001
|
1 200
|
1 356
|
1 481
|
FI
|
EGF/2016/001
|
Microsoft
|
Computer programming
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
5 364 000
|
4 559 861
|
1 441
|
1 629
|
2 799
|
FI
|
EGF/2016/008
|
Nokia Network Systems
|
Computers, electronic and optical products
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
2 641 800
|
2 641 800
|
821
|
777
|
3 400
|
FI
|
EGF/2017/002
|
Microsoft
|
Computer programming
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
3 520 080
|
2 937 160
|
1 000
|
883
|
3 326
|
FI
|
EGF/2017/005
|
Retail
|
Retail trade
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
2 499 360
|
1 581 287
|
1 500
|
1 467
|
1 078
|
FI
|
EGF/2020/007
|
Finnair
|
Air transport
|
a
|
Crisis
|
1 752 360
|
N/A
|
500
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
FR
|
EGF/2014/005
|
GAD
|
Slaughterhouse
|
a
|
Crisis
|
918 000
|
442 749
|
760
|
559
|
792
|
FR
|
EGF/2014/006
|
PSA
|
Automotive
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
12 704 605
|
12 464 172
|
2 357
|
2 357
|
5 288
|
FR
|
EGF/2014/017
|
Mory-Ducros
|
Land transport
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 052 200
|
4 393 239
|
2 513
|
2 513
|
1 748
|
FR
|
EGF/2015/010
|
MoryGlobal
|
Land transport
|
a
|
Crisis
|
5 146 800
|
409 3159
|
2 132
|
2 132
|
1 920
|
FR
|
EGF/2017/009
|
Air France
|
Air transport
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
9 894 483
|
9 846 483
|
1 858
|
1 858
|
5 300
|
IE
|
EGF/2014/007
|
Andersen Ireland
|
Jewellery
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
1 501 200
|
1 089 699
|
138
|
138
|
7 896
|
IE
|
EGF/2014/016
|
Lufthansa Technik
|
Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
2 490 758
|
1 790 014
|
250
|
253
|
7 075
|
IE
|
EGF/2015/006
|
PWA International
|
Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
442 293
|
442 293
|
108
|
86
|
5 143
|
IT
|
EGF/2014/010
|
Whirlpool
|
Domestic appliances
|
a
|
Crisis
|
1 890 000
|
1 572 723
|
608
|
608
|
2 587
|
IT
|
EGF/2015/004
|
Alitalia
|
Air transport
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 414 848
|
23 436
|
184
|
184
|
127
|
IT
|
EGF/2017/004
|
Almaviva
|
Call centre
|
a
|
Crisis
|
3 347 370
|
812 669
|
1 610
|
1 423
|
571
|
NL
|
EGF/2014/002
|
Gelderland and Overijssel
|
Construction of buildings
|
b
|
Crisis
|
1 625 781
|
1 167 559
|
475
|
467
|
2 500
|
NL
|
EGF/2016/005
|
Drenthe Overijssel Retail
|
Retail trade
|
b
|
Crisis
|
1 818 750
|
853 871
|
800
|
754
|
1 132
|
NL
|
EGF/2018/001
|
Financial service activities
|
Financial service activities
|
b
|
Crisis
|
1 192 500
|
486 410
|
450
|
179
|
2 717
|
NL
|
EGF/2020/004
|
KLM
|
Air transport
|
a
|
Crisis
|
5 019 218
|
N/A
|
1 201
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
PT
|
EGF/2018/002
|
Norte Centro Lisboa wearing apparel
|
Apparel
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
4 655 883
|
N/A
|
730
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
SE
|
EGF/2015/009
|
Volvo Trucks
|
Automotive
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 793 710
|
1 120 124
|
500
|
450
|
2 489
|
SE
|
EGF/2016/002
|
Ericsson
|
Computers, electronic and optical products
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
3 957 918
|
933 939
|
918
|
224
|
4 169
|
SE
|
EGF/2017/007
|
Ericsson
|
Computers, electronic and optical products
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
2 130 400
|
290 092
|
900
|
80
|
3 626
|
Source: EGF Database
Table 7. EGF applications sorted by sector (without withdrawn or rejected applications)
Sector (NACE)
|
Case ref.
|
Case name
|
Member State
|
Intervention criterion
|
Globalisation /crisis
|
EGF amount requested (€)
|
EGF amount spent (€)
|
Workers targeted
|
Workers helped
|
Average EGF amount spent per worker
|
Air transport
|
EGF/2020/007
|
Finnair
|
FI
|
a
|
Crisis
|
1 752 360
|
N/A
|
500
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Air transport
|
EGF/2017/009
|
Air France
|
FR
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
9 894 483
|
9 846 483
|
1 858
|
1 858
|
5 300
|
Air transport
|
EGF/2015/004
|
Alitalia
|
IT
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 414 848
|
23 436
|
184
|
184
|
127
|
Air transport
|
EGF/2020/004
|
KLM
|
NL
|
a
|
Crisis
|
5 019 218
|
N/A
|
1 201
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Apparel
|
EGF/2017/006
|
Galicia wearing apparel
|
ES
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
720 000
|
306 818
|
303
|
146
|
2 101
|
Apparel
|
EGF/2018/002
|
Norte Centro Lisboa wearing apparel
|
PT
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
4 655 883
|
N/A
|
730
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Automotive
|
EGF/2015/003
|
Ford Genk
|
BE
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
6 268 564
|
4 753 175
|
4 500
|
4 500
|
1 056
|
Automotive
|
EGF/2015/002
|
Adam Opel
|
DE
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 958 623
|
3 811 240
|
2 692
|
2 621
|
1 454
|
Automotive
|
EGF/2016/004
|
Comunidad Valenciana Automotive
|
ES
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
856 800
|
173 161
|
250
|
134
|
1 292
|
Automotive
|
EGF/2014/006
|
PSA
|
FR
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
12 704 605
|
12 464 172
|
2 357
|
2 357
|
5 288
|
Automotive
|
EGF/2015/009
|
Volvo Trucks
|
SE
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 793 710
|
1 120 124
|
500
|
450
|
2 489
|
Bakery products
|
EGF/2014/001
|
Nutriart
|
EL
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 096 000
|
1 536 355
|
508
|
249
|
6 170
|
Broadcasting
|
EGF/2014/018
|
Attica Broadcasting
|
EL
|
b
|
Crisis
|
5 046 000
|
1 214 929
|
928
|
349
|
3 481
|
Building of ships and boats
|
EGF/2020/001
|
Galicia shipbuilding ancillary sectors
|
ES
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
2 054 400
|
N/A
|
500
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Building of ships and boats
|
EGF/2014/008
|
STX Rauma
|
FI
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 426 800
|
1 311 961
|
565
|
589
|
2 227
|
Call centre
|
EGF/2017/004
|
Almaviva
|
IT
|
a
|
Crisis
|
3 347 370
|
812 669
|
1 610
|
1 423
|
571
|
Chemicals
|
EGF/2016/003
|
petroleum and chemicals
|
EE
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
1 131 358
|
821 523
|
800
|
492
|
1 670
|
Computer programming
|
EGF/2015/005
|
Computer programming
|
FI
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
2 623 200
|
2 008 001
|
1 200
|
1 356
|
1 481
|
Computer programming
|
EGF/2016/001
|
Microsoft
|
FI
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
5 364 000
|
4 559 861
|
1 441
|
1 629
|
2 799
|
Computer programming
|
EGF/2017/002
|
Microsoft
|
FI
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
3 520 080
|
2 937 160
|
1 000
|
883
|
3 326
|
Computers, electronic and optical products
|
EGF/2016/008
|
Nokia Network Systems
|
FI
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
2 641 800
|
2 641 800
|
821
|
777
|
3 400
|
Computers, electronic and optical products
|
EGF/2016/002
|
Ericsson
|
SE
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
3 957 918
|
933 939
|
918
|
224
|
4 169
|
Computers, electronic and optical products
|
EGF/2017/007
|
Ericsson
|
SE
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
2 130 400
|
290 092
|
900
|
80
|
3 626
|
Construction of buildings
|
EGF/2014/002
|
Gelderland and Overijssel
|
NL
|
b
|
Crisis
|
1 625 781
|
1 167 559
|
475
|
467
|
2 500
|
Domestic appliances
|
EGF/2014/010
|
Whirlpool
|
IT
|
a
|
Crisis
|
1 890 000
|
1 572 723
|
608
|
608
|
2 587
|
Financial service activities
|
EGF/2018/001
|
Financial service activities
|
NL
|
b
|
Crisis
|
1 192 500
|
486 410
|
450
|
179
|
2 717
|
Food and beverage services
|
EGF/2014/003
|
Aragon
|
ES
|
b
|
Crisis
|
960 000
|
804 140
|
280
|
274
|
2 935
|
Jewellery
|
EGF/2014/007
|
Andersen Ireland
|
IE
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
1 501 200
|
1 089 699
|
138
|
138
|
7 896
|
Land transport
|
EGF/2014/017
|
Mory-Ducros
|
FR
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 052 200
|
4 393 239
|
2 513
|
2 513
|
1 748
|
Land transport
|
EGF/2015/010
|
MoryGlobal
|
FR
|
a
|
Crisis
|
5 146 800
|
409 3159
|
2 132
|
2 132
|
1 920
|
Manufacture of basic metals
|
EGF/2014/012
|
ArcelorMittal
|
BE
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 591 486
|
1 443 884
|
910
|
780
|
1 851
|
Manufacture of basic metals
|
EGF/2020/003
|
GMH Guss
|
DE
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 081 707
|
N/A
|
476
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Manufacture of fabricated metal products
|
EGF/2014/004
|
Comunidad Valenciana metal
|
ES
|
b
|
Crisis
|
1 019 184
|
321 877
|
300
|
174
|
1 850
|
Manufacture of glass
|
EGF/2015/007
|
Hainaut-Namur Glass
|
BE
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
1 095 544
|
814 869
|
412
|
342
|
2 383
|
Manufacture of machinery and equipment
|
EGF/2014/011
|
Caterpillar
|
BE
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 222 854
|
829 415
|
630
|
501
|
1 656
|
Manufacture of machinery and equipment
|
EGF/2015/012
|
Hainaut Machinery
|
BE
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
1 824 041
|
726 183
|
488
|
355
|
2 046
|
Manufacture of machinery and equipment
|
EGF/2017/010
|
Caterpillar
|
BE
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
4 621 616
|
4 068 634
|
2 285
|
1 772
|
2 296
|
Mining of coal and lignite
|
EGF/2017/001
|
Castilla y León mining of coal
|
ES
|
c (Labour market)
|
Globalisation
|
1 002 264
|
631 186
|
339
|
198
|
3 188
|
Publishing
|
EGF/2014/015
|
Attica Publishing Services
|
EL
|
b
|
Crisis
|
3 746 700
|
816 310
|
705
|
205
|
3 982
|
Publishing
|
EGF/2018/003
|
Attica Publishing Activities
|
EL
|
b
|
Crisis
|
2 308 500
|
N/A
|
550
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft
|
EGF/2014/016
|
Lufthansa Technik
|
IE
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
2 490 758
|
1 790 014
|
250
|
253
|
7 075
|
Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft
|
EGF/2015/006
|
PWA International
|
IE
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Globalisation
|
442 293
|
442 293
|
108
|
86
|
5 143
|
Retail trade
|
EGF/2014/009
|
Sprider Stores
|
EL
|
a
|
Crisis
|
7 290 900
|
2 482 743
|
761
|
517
|
4 802
|
Retail trade
|
EGF/2014/013
|
Odyssefs Fokas
|
EL
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 444 000
|
2 293 466
|
600
|
379
|
6 051
|
Retail trade
|
EGF/2015/011
|
Supermarket Larissa
|
EL
|
a
|
Crisis
|
6 468 000
|
2 045 939
|
557
|
497
|
4 117
|
Retail trade
|
EGF/2017/003
|
Attica retail
|
EL
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Crisis
|
2 949 150
|
602 708
|
725
|
217
|
2 777
|
Retail trade
|
EGF/2017/005
|
Retail
|
FI
|
b
|
Globalisation
|
2 499 360
|
1 581 287
|
1 500
|
1 467
|
1 078
|
Retail trade
|
EGF/2016/005
|
Drenthe Overijssel Retail
|
NL
|
b
|
Crisis
|
1 818 750
|
853 871
|
800
|
754
|
1 132
|
Rubber and plastic products
|
EGF/2017/008
|
Goodyear
|
DE
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
2 165 231
|
1 171 002
|
646
|
622
|
1 883
|
Slaughterhouse
|
EGF/2014/005
|
GAD
|
FR
|
a
|
Crisis
|
918 000
|
442 749
|
760
|
559
|
792
|
Solar modules
|
EGF/2014/014
|
Aleo Solar
|
DE
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 094 760
|
533 480
|
476
|
408
|
1 308
|
Tourism
|
EGF/2020/002
|
Estonia Tourism
|
EE
|
c (Exceptional Circumstances)
|
Crisis
|
4 474 480
|
N/A
|
5 060
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Warehousing, support activities for transportation, Services to buildings & landscape activities
|
EGF/2020/005
|
Swissport
|
BE
|
a
|
Crisis
|
3 719 224
|
N/A
|
1 468
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Wholesale trade
|
EGF/2015/001
|
Broadcom
|
FI
|
a
|
Globalisation
|
1 365 000
|
876 467
|
500
|
374
|
2 343
|
Source: EGF Database
Table 8. EGF applications, including the breakdown by gender and age of targeted workers and helped workers (without withdrawn or rejected applications)
Case ref.
|
Case name
|
Member State
|
Sector (NACE)
|
Workers targeted
|
Men targeted
|
Women targeted
|
Targeted age group 15-24
|
Targeted age group 25-54
|
Targeted age group 55-64
|
Targeted age group >64
|
Workers helped
|
EGF/2014/001
|
Nutriart
|
EL
|
Bakery products
|
508
|
337
|
171
|
1
|
466
|
41
|
0
|
249
|
EGF/2014/002
|
Gelderland and Overijssel
|
NL
|
Construction of buildings
|
475
|
440
|
35
|
15
|
356
|
104
|
0
|
467
|
EGF/2014/003
|
Aragon
|
ES
|
Food and beverage services
|
280
|
97
|
183
|
26
|
232
|
22
|
0
|
274
|
EGF/2014/004
|
Comunidad Valenciana metal
|
ES
|
Manufacture of fabricated metal products
|
300
|
258
|
42
|
9
|
276
|
15
|
0
|
174
|
EGF/2014/005
|
GAD
|
FR
|
Slaughterhouse
|
760
|
487
|
273
|
6
|
620
|
133
|
1
|
559
|
EGF/2014/006
|
PSA
|
FR
|
Automotive
|
2 357
|
1 896
|
461
|
2
|
968
|
1 387
|
0
|
2 357
|
EGF/2014/007
|
Andersen Ireland
|
IE
|
Jewellery
|
138
|
36
|
102
|
1
|
126
|
11
|
0
|
138
|
EGF/2014/008
|
STX Rauma
|
FI
|
Building of ships and boats
|
565
|
496
|
69
|
7
|
322
|
234
|
2
|
589
|
EGF/2014/009
|
Sprider Stores
|
EL
|
Retail trade
|
761
|
112
|
649
|
37
|
720
|
4
|
0
|
517
|
EGF/2014/010
|
Whirlpool
|
IT
|
Domestic appliances
|
608
|
422
|
186
|
32
|
514
|
62
|
0
|
608
|
EGF/2014/011
|
Caterpillar
|
BE
|
Manufacture of machinery and equipment
|
630
|
607
|
23
|
42
|
475
|
113
|
0
|
501
|
EGF/2014/012
|
ArcelorMittal
|
BE
|
Manufacture of basic metals
|
910
|
871
|
39
|
25
|
840
|
45
|
0
|
780
|
EGF/2014/013
|
Odyssefs Fokas
|
EL
|
Retail trade
|
600
|
65
|
535
|
6
|
554
|
39
|
1
|
379
|
EGF/2014/014
|
Aleo Solar
|
DE
|
Solar modules
|
476
|
262
|
214
|
3
|
374
|
98
|
1
|
408
|
EGF/2014/015
|
Attica Publishing Services
|
EL
|
Publishing
|
705
|
391
|
314
|
12
|
616
|
71
|
6
|
205
|
EGF/2014/016
|
Lufthansa Technik
|
IE
|
Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft
|
250
|
220
|
30
|
12
|
167
|
70
|
1
|
253
|
EGF/2014/017
|
Mory-Ducros
|
FR
|
Land transport
|
2 513
|
2 137
|
376
|
18
|
2 054
|
436
|
5
|
2 513
|
EGF/2014/018
|
Attica Broadcasting
|
EL
|
Broadcasting
|
928
|
521
|
407
|
12
|
892
|
22
|
2
|
349
|
EGF/2015/001
|
Broadcom
|
FI
|
Wholesale trade
|
500
|
442
|
58
|
1
|
489
|
10
|
0
|
374
|
EGF/2015/002
|
Adam Opel
|
DE
|
Automotive
|
2 692
|
2 583
|
109
|
60
|
1 926
|
706
|
0
|
2 621
|
EGF/2015/003
|
Ford Genk
|
BE
|
Automotive
|
4 500
|
3 956
|
544
|
19
|
3 239
|
1 240
|
2
|
4 500
|
EGF/2015/004
|
Alitalia
|
IT
|
Air transport
|
184
|
129
|
55
|
0
|
178
|
6
|
0
|
184
|
EGF/2015/005
|
Computer programming
|
FI
|
Computer programming
|
1 200
|
660
|
540
|
24
|
1 008
|
156
|
12
|
1 356
|
EGF/2015/006
|
PWA International
|
IE
|
Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft
|
108
|
98
|
10
|
2
|
88
|
17
|
1
|
86
|
EGF/2015/007
|
Hainaut-Namur Glass
|
BE
|
Manufacture of glass
|
412
|
403
|
9
|
0
|
315
|
97
|
0
|
342
|
EGF/2015/009
|
/Volvo Trucks
|
SE
|
Automotive
|
500
|
387
|
113
|
55
|
375
|
61
|
9
|
450
|
EGF/2015/010 FR/
|
MoryGlobal
|
FR
|
Land transport
|
2 132
|
1 740
|
392
|
2
|
1 721
|
408
|
1
|
2 132
|
EGF/2015/011
|
Supermarket Larissa
|
EL
|
Retail trade
|
557
|
194
|
363
|
0
|
529
|
28
|
0
|
497
|
EGF/2015/012
|
Hainaut Machinery
|
BE
|
Manufacture of machinery and equipment
|
488
|
460
|
28
|
29
|
284
|
175
|
0
|
355
|
EGF/2016/001
|
Microsoft
|
FI
|
Computer programming
|
1 441
|
864
|
577
|
0
|
1 296
|
144
|
1
|
1 629
|
EGF/2016/002
|
Ericsson
|
SE
|
Computers, electronic and optical products
|
918
|
643
|
275
|
0
|
22
|
589
|
307
|
224
|
EGF/2016/003
|
petroleum and chemicals
|
EE
|
Chemicals
|
800
|
565
|
235
|
31
|
427
|
334
|
8
|
492
|
EGF/2016/004
|
Comunidad Valenciana Automotive
|
ES
|
Automotive
|
250
|
241
|
9
|
0
|
192
|
58
|
0
|
134
|
EGF/2016/005
|
Drenthe Overijssel Retail
|
NL
|
Retail trade
|
800
|
570
|
230
|
492
|
243
|
64
|
1
|
754
|
EGF/2016/008
|
Nokia Network Systems
|
FI
|
Computers, electronic and optical products
|
821
|
608
|
213
|
6
|
644
|
167
|
4
|
777
|
EGF/2017/001
|
Castilla y León mining of coal
|
ES
|
Mining of coal and lignite
|
339
|
328
|
11
|
0
|
332
|
7
|
0
|
198
|
EGF/2017/002
|
Microsoft
|
FI
|
Computer programming
|
1 000
|
740
|
260
|
0
|
950
|
50
|
0
|
883
|
EGF/2017/003
|
Attica retail
|
EL
|
Retail trade
|
725
|
408
|
317
|
0
|
107
|
438
|
180
|
217
|
EGF/2017/004
|
Almaviva
|
IT
|
Call centre
|
1 610
|
334
|
1 276
|
0
|
1 375
|
223
|
12
|
1 423
|
EGF/2017/005
|
Retail
|
FI
|
Retail trade
|
1 500
|
355
|
1 145
|
103
|
1 129
|
263
|
5
|
1 467
|
EGF/2017/006
|
Galicia wearing apparel
|
ES
|
Apparel
|
303
|
50
|
253
|
2
|
230
|
71
|
0
|
146
|
EGF/2017/007
|
Ericsson
|
SE
|
Computers, electronic and optical products
|
900
|
600
|
300
|
1
|
622
|
272
|
5
|
80
|
EGF/2017/008
|
Goodyear
|
DE
|
Rubber and plastic products
|
646
|
641
|
5
|
15
|
461
|
168
|
2
|
622
|
EGF/2017/009
|
Air France
|
FR
|
Air transport
|
1 858
|
974
|
884
|
0
|
661
|
1 196
|
1
|
1 858
|
EGF/2017/010
|
Caterpillar
|
BE
|
Manufacture of machinery and equipment
|
2 285
|
2 113
|
172
|
2
|
2 022
|
263
|
0
|
1 772
|
EGF/2018/001
|
Financial service activities
|
NL
|
Financial service activities
|
450
|
183
|
267
|
38
|
291
|
104
|
17
|
179
|
EGF/2018/002
|
Norte Centro Lisboa wearing apparel
|
PT
|
Apparel
|
730
|
83
|
647
|
12
|
568
|
150
|
0
|
N/A
|
EGF/2018/003
|
Attica Publishing Activities
|
EL
|
Publishing
|
550
|
320
|
230
|
3
|
466
|
80
|
1
|
N/A
|
EGF/2020/001
|
Galicia shipbuilding ancillary sectors
|
ES
|
Building of ships and boats
|
500
|
470
|
30
|
17
|
36
|
391
|
56
|
N/A
|
EGF/2020/002
|
Estonia Tourism
|
EE
|
Tourism
|
5 060
|
1 970
|
3 090
|
700
|
3 330
|
1 030
|
0
|
N/A
|
EGF/2020/003
|
GMH Guss
|
DE
|
Manufacture of basic metals
|
476
|
455
|
21
|
7
|
293
|
175
|
1
|
N/A
|
EGF/2020/004
|
KLM
|
NL
|
Air Transport
|
1 201
|
933
|
268
|
35
|
789
|
353
|
24
|
N/A
|
EGF/2020/005
|
Swissport
|
BE
|
Warehousing, support activities for transportation, Services to buildings & landscape activities
|
1 468
|
1 086
|
382
|
83
|
1 185
|
199
|
1
|
N/A
|
EGF/2020/007
|
Finnair
|
FI
|
Air Transport
|
500
|
280
|
220
|
19
|
340
|
141
|
0
|
N/A
|
Total workers targeted and helped
|
54 168
|
36 521
|
17 647
|
2 024
|
38 733
|
12 741
|
670
|
37 072
|
Source: EGF Database
Figure 14. Number of EGF cases per sector (NACE Rev. 2) for all 54 cases in 2014-2020
Annex 5: EGF intervention logic 2014-2020
Source: based on Ramboll Management Consulting, SEOR (2020), Study supporting the ex post evaluation of the EGF 2014-2020, Final Report, p. 93.
Annex 6: The evolution of the rules of the EGF between 2007 and 2020
Source: DG EMPL, based on Commission staff working document on the mid-term evaluation of the EGF 2014–2020, SWD(2018) 192/16.5.2018, p.14